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ABBREVIATION LIST 
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17. NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
18. NI: Northern Ireland. 
19. NICRA: Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association. 
20. PIRA: Provisional Irish Republican Army. 
21. PM: Prime Minister (UK). 
22. SEA: Single European Act. 
23. TEU: Treaty on the European Union. 
24. TWI: Trade Weigh Index. 
25. UK: United Kingdom (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland). 
26. VAT: Value-added Tax. 
27. WTO: World Trade Organization. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 
and of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and the evolution of it to the 
European Union (EU) as we know it in the early 90’s, none of the State Members or the 
leaders of the Community thought that someday, one of the members of the Community 
decided to leave the group. In this final master project, entitled “The Brexit’s Giants 
Causeway. Analysis of the possible solutions to the Irish border issue Post-Brexit”, we 
will try to delve into the conflict that emerged again over the Irish border due to Brexit 
and we will analyse some solutions proposed by the doctrine to solve this circumstance 
(even we will propose a mixed own-made solution to the issue).  
Brexit set a precedent that was believed, as has been said, unthinkable. The 
withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European project creates several sit-
uations that are difficult to manage due to their importance. One of them is the situation 
on the Irish border. Although it is true that it is not the only Member State of the Eu-
ropean Union that has a land border with the UK (Remember that Spain has the border 
area of the southern province of Cádiz with Gibraltar), the Irish border has always been 
on the table of negotiations as one of the hottest and most difficult points to manage. 
The importance of this border and the concern about the possible consequences of a 
Brexit without agreement in that area, reside, fundamentally, in the violent and tense 
history that exists between the area of the Republic and the northern area, which ended 
in 1998. 
The Republic of Ireland and UK have had for decades certain tensions, which 
have even led to armed conflict from the late 60’s to the late 90’s in Northern 
Ireland. The most recent conflict, finished in 1998, with the signature of the Good Fri1 -
day Agreement (GFA) (as the Catholic society named it), also known as The Belfast 
Agreement (as the protestant society named the document) . But this has not been a 2
struggle that just had its violent moments in the 20th century. Ever since from the first 
inhabitants of the island of Great Britain who went to the Island of Ireland to evangelize 
the Celts, conflicts emerged in the VIII century. What at first was a confrontation of dif-
ferent religions Christianity against Celtic paganism, became a conflict between differ-
ent creeds in Christianity in the reign of Henry VIII.  3
Tensions flared in the Cromwell government, and legislative measures were tak-
en to punish the profession of the Catholic faith on both British and Irish territory .  Al4 -
ready during the time that Ireland was annexed to the UK, since the signing of the 
 JEFF WALLENFELDT. The Troubles.. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. May 14, 2019. London. [online][date 1
of access: 28/02/2020] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/The-Troubles-Northern-Ireland-
history
 UK GOVERNMENT, NORTHERN IRELAND'S GOVERNMENT AND IRELAND'S GOVERNMENT. Belfast. The 2
Good Friday Agreement (The Belfast Agreement). 1998 [online][date of access: 05/02/2020] Available at: 
https://www.dfa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-
agreement.pdf
 Conflicto nor-irlandés. Antecedentes.[online][date of access:29/02/2020]. Available at: https://es3 -
.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conflicto_norirland%C3%A9s#Antecedentes
 Penal Laws. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. London. March 27, 2008. [on line] [date of access: 4
05/11/2019]. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Penal-Laws
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Union Act in 1801,  these discriminatory laws continued to apply against the Catholic 5
population, not only from Ireland, but also from the UK. Although the laws punishing 
the practice of Catholicism were abolished in the 1830s, their consequences were still 
de facto visible in Irish society, where, remember, the vast majority of the population is 
Catholic . 6
Despite the abolition of the Penal Laws a decade earlier, in the mid-1940s, the 
Great Famine (1845-1849), revealed the great differences between the British and Irish 
landowners. The Irish population suffered from emanation over the absence of potatoes 
and evictions due to lack of rent payments. As a result, deaths among that spectrum of 
the population due to starvation and freezing grew exponentially.  While the Irish suf7 -
fered such misfortunes, British landowners continued their commercial activities. In ad-
dition, countries like the United States, where many Irish people had flew due to 
famine, were subjected to quotas in exports of food and supplies to the Irish population, 
by order of the UK itself . 8
Afterwards in 1922, when Ireland achieved independence from the UK (after an 
independence war ), forming the Free State of Ireland (Saorstát Éireann), relations be9 -
tween the two States became more tense, until 1949, when the Republic of Ireland was 
created as it is known today (after several years with some uncertainty regarding how 
the territory should be governed), entirely independent of the UK and outside the British 
Commonwealth of Nations.  10
Since the independence of the Republic of the British Empire, the relations with 
UK were very tense, even during part of the membership of UK in the EEC/EU (during 
The Troubles), until the entente cordiale created with the GFA. As we said before, the 
main goal of this paper is to glimpse what would be the better solution to the Irish bor-
der issue, regarding the difficult situation created by the Brexit, and if this solution can 
protect the GFA in all senses. We understand that the border between the two Irelands is 
one of the pillars of the Brexit negotiations, due to the aforementioned historical back-
ground and the social and political demands of the Irish island to maintain the cordial 
relations established in 1998. 
The legal problem that Brexit presented to us (taking into account the brief his-
torical excursus made previously) place two questions on the table, which we should 
know how to answer or have a slight idea of the result at the end of this analysis. The 
 Act of Union. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. London. January 01, 2020. [online][date of access: 5
03/01/2020. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Act-of-Union-United-Kingdom-1801
 Catholic Emancipation. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. London. April 24, 2019. [on line] [date of ac6 -
cess: 05/11/2019]. Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/Catholic-Emancipation
 Irish Potato Famine. History.com Editors. October 2017 (updated July 2019). [online][date of access: 7
26/12/2019] Available at: https://www.history.com/topics/immigration/irish-potato-famine
 WOODHAM-SMITH, CECIL .The Great Hunger. Ireland: 1845-1849. 1962. 1st Edition . Hamish Hamilton 8
Editions. London., pages 48-49.
 The Anglo-Irish War. BBC Home. 24th September 2014. London. [online][date of access: 19th March 9
2020] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af04.shtml
 Irlanda. Wikipedia. 22nd August 2003. [online][date of Access: 15th March 2020] Available at: https://10
es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irlanda
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first of all is: what would be, in the framework of Brexit and in the territory of the island 
of Ireland, the solution so that the establishment of a hard border between the two Ire-
lands can be effectively avoided, and the GFA can be protected? (this is the main goal of 
our paper); and the second question, related to the establishment or not of a hard border 
in Ireland, is our thesis: Brexit (a hard one) can end the entente cordiale between estab-
lished by the GFA in 1998. 
To answer the first question, we are going to analyse, at the end of the paper, 
several proposals to solve the Irish border issue. And to answer the second one, to verify 
our thesis, we will use the rest of the paper (including this introduction) to try to envis-
age this answer. But first, is proper to study the previous context (during the UK’s 
membership in the EU and Brexit). 
The methodology used to prepare this work is mainly based on an analysis of 
both doctrinal and normative sources related to the topic as well as the use of newspaper 
articles. The doctrinal sources have served to create a knowledge basis about the Brexit, 
and possible solutions to the border problem. The use and analysis of normative sources 
of information has served to be able to delve deeper into the subject and to visualize all 
the points that have been working in the field of Brexit negotiations. Also it is been used 
infographic sources, useful to have a first approach to some points of the work, as well 
as documental sources, in which we can include some letters written by the UK’s PM 
David Cameron and Theresa May to the President of the European Council Donald 
Tusk. At the end of the paper, we will see the use of quantitative sources as EU Com-
mission graphics and own-made graphics, to illustrate the last section of this work. 
This project is composed by 3 sections: in the first one, we will talk about how 
was the accession of the Republic of Ireland and the UK to the EEC and its relations 
during the membership of the UK in the EEC/EU, with a little reference to the PEACE 
programme, initiated by the EU in 1995; the second section, relating to the Brexit, we 
will address what Brexit is, what was the path that UK took until the day of the referen-
dum,  and several items regarding the voting itself. After that we will point the general 
sections of the negotiation and the specific ones on the Irish border issue, and a proposal 
from the European Commission and the Theresa May’s government, the Backstop. On 
the last one, we are going to talk about the situation after the Brexit, in what point the 
negotiations are to this date and its implications, the implementation or transition period 
and several proposals to solve the border issue, including an own-created solution for 
the issue. 
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2. ACCESSION OF IRELAND AND UK TO THE EEC AND RELATIONS DU-
RING THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UK. 
 The joining of Ireland and the UK to the EEC is our first point to talk about. The 
importance of this fact implied, in the day that the accession was effective, within the 
Community, the Franco-German axis was no more the leading force. The entrance of 
the UK to the EEC created a new status quo, where the power began to be divided be-
tween France, Germany and UK. 
 Before the accession of UK and Ireland to the EEC, in 1959 the UK joined the 
European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA). But, before that accession, the UK did not 
want to participate of the European project, initiated with the creation of the ECSC. The 
country had strong relations with the United States, and, in that moment, they only were 
part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Brussels Treaty and the 
Council of Europe. Those times were decolonisation periods and the UK were one of 
the few countries that still retain some colonial territory.  11
The accession of Ireland and the UK in the EEC was effective in 1973, but the 
Accession Treaty and Annexes and Protocols were signed in 1972, with Denmark. The 
petition to join the Communities was sent in 1961 by Ireland, the UK, Denmark and 
Norway, but, the French President Charles de Gaulle, voted against the accession of the 
UK (what was also harmful for Ireland and Denmark). De Gaulle argued that, the en-
trance of the British in the Community would be a serious problem, because of the sup-
posed influence of the United States in the British territory. That French opposition was 
established again in 1967, and, in consequence, the negotiations with those countries 
were blocked.  12
In 1973, only 3 out of the 4 countries that applied for the entrance to the Union 
(Norway rejected to join the EEC after the celebration of a referendum) became Mem-
ber States. The Accession Treaty  regulated the conditions of entrance in the Communi13 -
ty for the applicants. Obviously, in that treaty, there was a section for subjects as, im-
plementation of Communitarian laws in some aspects like trade, capitals, agriculture, 
and fishing rights, and representation weight in the European institutions. That type of 
subjects were regulated in the Annexes.  
 DE AREILZA CARVAJAL, JOSÉ M. El Reino Unido en la Unión Europea.. Estudios de Política Exterior. 11
Mayo-Junio 1996. Nº51. [online] [date of Access: 30th March 2020] Available at: https://www.politicaex-
terior.com/articulos/politica-exterior/el-reino-unido-en-la-union-europea/
 ¿Anticipó Charles de Gaulle el Brexit?  Stéphanie Trouillard. France 24. 20th October 2019. [online]12
[date of access: 29/02/2020] Available at: https://www.france24.com/es/20191020-predico-de-gaulle-bre-
xit-francia-reino-unido
 Treaty between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal republic of Germany, the Italian Republic, the 13
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands (Member States of the European Communi-
ties), the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom 
of Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Economic 
Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community. Official Journal of the European Economic 
Community. March 1972. Brussels. [on line][date of access: 01/02/2020] Available at: https://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:11972B/TXT&from=ES
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Considering all this, is proper to analyse briefly which the conditions of the ac-
cession were for both countries in some aspects that are important, as well as the rela-
tions between the two nations and the EU’s position regarding the conflict. 
2.1. Conditions of accession 
 This section has the principal aim to analyse using the base of the Accession 
Treaty text, what were the legal accession conditions of both countries in the EEC. We 
consider that it would be appropriate to see, several assets, such as the representatives in 
the Institutions of the different Communities, the Common Custom Tariffs, and elimina-
tion of the quantitative restrictions (one of the pillars of the Common Market) or fish-
eries. 
In this part, we see that, comparing the number of Irish and British representa-
tives or delegates in the three institutions (ECSC, EURATOM and EEC), there was a 
big difference. UK had 36 representatives and Ireland only 10 in the Assembly (Art. 
10). That gap also has a negative consequence to Ireland, because of the lesser power 
weight in the Council and its decisions. That contrast is also established in article 21, 
where we can see that Ireland had 9 representatives in the Economic and Social Com-
mittee, and the UK, 24.  14
Taking into account this situation, we can see that in some articles of the Treaty 
the differences of application of some measures for the two countries were, in some as-
pects, very different, or the same for both of them. This can lead us to consider if the 
European Communities were taking into account the aspect of country population in a 
wide point of view and create situations not favourable to both countries at all and some 
inequities. 
In article 39, we notice that is the first time we see regulated the Common Cus-
toms Tariff.  In article 40, in relation to the previous article, we observe that the EEC 15
gave Ireland 4 years period to fully apply the tariff. These periods were directed to es-
tablish a reduction of the 50% of the Irish Tariffs in 1976.  The fact that the UK is not 
mentioned in this article, that led to believe that the UK was capable of apply the Tariff 
without different periods of adaptation. 
One of the most important items in the EEC acquis ( and in the EU one), is the 
abolishing of the quantitative restrictions. In article 43, the elimination of this type of 
constrains is again, different for some of the States. Ireland had a period of 5 years to 
maintain the export’s restriction to waste and scrap metal of iron or steel. The only con-
dition to maintain them is that they couldn’t be more detrimental for the Member States 
than for third States. 
 As today, the number of representatives in the organs of the EEC, were established regarding the popu14 -
lation of the Member States. In 1973, Ireland had 3.111.100 million of habitants and the United Kingdom 
had 56.229.268 million of habitants. This data is available at https://datosmacro.expansion.com/de-
mografia/poblacion/uk and https://datosmacro.expansion.com/demografia/poblacion/irlanda?anio=1973
 See at: https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/calculation-customs-duties/what-is-common-15
customs-tariff_en
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In terms of trade nomenclature, the UK had a period of 1 year for maintaining 
their own system and to adapt into the new one (Art. 46.2 p.1). Although we can think 
that the nomenclature is something piddling, for a country we must think that the sys-
tem of trade classification is the central pillar of a trade system, and also consider that it 
was one of the main points of the treaty. For a unified trade system as the EEC, every-
one has to “talk the same language”, in terms of trade.  
In article 48 we notice something very interesting. We observe how the EEC 
takes into account the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement. That document was 
signed by the UK and Ireland in 1965, with Sean Lemass as Taoiseach and Harold Wil-
son as Prime Minister of the UK, during the France’s veto to the accession of the UK to 
the EEC. That Agreement (Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement) had its roots in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in terms of abolishing customs barri-
ers between countries. Therefore, this Agreement didn’t have the unanimous satisfied 
reaction in the Irish government. The fact that Ireland signed an agreement with the UK 
on free trade, led some members of Lemass’s Government to think that it would be 
harmful for Ireland in terms of industrial competitiveness.  16
The Article 48.1 of the Accession Treaty was written as follows: 
“1. The provisions of this Title shall not prevent Ireland from applying to 
products originating in the United Kingdom arrangements enabling customs du-
ties and protective elements contained in customs duties of a fiscal nature to be 
eliminated more rapidly, in accordance with the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area 
Agreement, signed on 14 December 1965, and related Agreements.” 
What we can observe here, is a benefit to Ireland in terms of placing the Irish 
economy to the same level as the other Member States, the new and the original ones. 
The article previously mentioned talks about Ireland as the country that could apply the 
dispositions of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement, not the UK. We can consid-
er that as a helpful position for the Irish since it was evident that Ireland was not at the 
same economic level as the UK was at all. 
One of the most important items is article 100 that develops the aspects about 
fisheries and the inherent rights of the coastal countries. In fact, the Treaty was estab-
lishing a possibility of restriction of 9 years imposed by the member States (from 1973 
to 1982) according to the Regulation (EEC) No 2141/70 established by the Member 
States. The purpose of the regulation was to implement a common policy in fisheries 
industry . 17
 Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of 1965. Encyclopedia.com. February 2020. [online][date of access: 16
5th of March 2020] Available at: https://www.encyclopedia.com/international/encyclopedias-almanacs-
transcripts-and-maps/anglo-irish-free-trade-agreement-1965
 Regulation (EEC) Nº 2141/70, of the Council of 20 October 1970, laying down a common structural 17
common policy for the fishing industry. Council of the EEC. 1970. Brussels. [online][date of access: 08 
March 2020] Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/faf8bc88-
b4f4-423a-969d-5edd69304bf7/language-en
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In article 101 we point the zones, (both in Ireland and the UK) that have a 12 
nautical miles of restriction to develop their fishing rights. In the previous article (Art. 
100), we saw that there’s a restriction of the fishing areas of 6 nautical miles, but, in the 
article mentioned previously, this restriction is enlarged to 12 nautical miles in the fol-
lowing areas: 
“3. Ireland: 
- The north and west coasts, from Lough Foyle to Cork Harbour. 
- The east coast, from Carlingford Lough to Carnsore Point[...] 
4. The United Kingdom: 
- The Shetlands and Orkneys. 
- The north and the east of Scotland, from Cape Wrath to Berwick. 
- The north-east of England from Coquet River to Plamborough Head. 
- The south-west from Lyme Regis to Hartland Point (including twelve 
nautical miles around Lundy Island). 
- County Down.” 
So, in that subject, the UK is the one who is in a better situation regarding terri-
tory in fishing areas in comparison to Ireland. If we analyse the zones where the Mem-
ber States could impose their restrictions to the fishing rights of another Member States, 
the one that has a better circumstance is UK. We require to remember the importance of 
the fishing rights in the international custom, more specifically for the coastal countries. 
The article 104 is also a very interesting one, as we can read that the EEC allow 
to maintain the existing Trade Laws between Ireland and Northern Ireland. That’s some-
thing that, if we think about Brexit (and its possible solutions) could be an answer to the 
problem. A sort of “time travelling” and apply again these laws, that we can imagine 
that in those times, they were already avoiding the problem that they are having actually 
in the present days. 
But and it is known that, if we analyse the current economy system and the eco-
nomic situation of both countries, taking laws that were into force decades ago, it is not 
the solution, because, as we know, the laws have the intention to regulate particular sit-
uation in a particular time (although that the perfect situation would be that the circum-
stance does not change at all and the law would be still existing ad infinitum). In the 
only point that we see that UK is the one that is more affected is in terms of financial 
contributions (art. 129). We see that Ireland had to contribute a 0.6% when the UK had 
to contribute a 19%, so, in terms of national economy and national wealth, Europe took 
into account the situation of both countries. 
If we can deduce anything from the brief analysis of the Accession Treaty, we 
can say that, in an enormous number of trade subjects, UK was the most beneficiary of 
the regulation in comparison with Ireland. Is proper to consider that is like it is, because, 
first of all, the economic conditions of both were not similar at all. Ireland was in a 
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worst economic situation than the UK due to their primary sector-based economy. Even 
the other conditions, such as the population, have an enormous impact to a country and 
how it is perceived by the other States. In terms of trade, Ireland had to apply some dis-
positions that made the country able more easily to place themselves to the same level 
in economic terms than the UK, or even Denmark.  
But, if  we examine the simple fact that Ireland had this dispositions in favour, 
we can come to the conclusion that, this dispositions reflects that Ireland needed more 
“help” to be at the same level as the rest of the new Member States, and, consequently, 
as the original Member States. 
2.2. Relations between both countries during the membership of the UK into the 
EEC/EU. 
In the terms of their relationship, analysing the historical facts, we can notice 
that the relations between the UK and Ireland were fragile during a very big time of 
their membership. Here we will try to see the type of interaction the countries had be-
tween them and the end of the armed conflict, and what was the position of the Eu-
ropean Union in this matter. Beyond the legal sphere of the accession and the duality of 
conditions, the relations Ireland- UK are a very important subject to point, because of 
the armed conflict in Northern Ireland during this membership. 
In 1969 (the French veto to the UK’s accession to the EEC continued by De 
Gaulle’s Government), the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) began to 
claim peacefully in Northern Ireland to stop all the discriminatory laws against the 
catholic community in the northern Irish territory . Later on, the hard faction of the 18
unionists, began to make violent acts (during the NICRA manifestations) against the 
protestant sector of the political society. In the earliest 70s, was created inside the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) , the faction 19
that we know as those that carried out the bloodiest acts during the conflict (called The 
Troubles ), until the cessation of their activity in 1998, with the signing of the Belfast 20
Agreement also known as The Good Friday Agreement .  21
Between all those moments, the accession of the UK and Ireland into the EEC 
was a fact, but, the relations between the countries were not good enough. Recall that 
The Troubles began in the late 60’s, so, we can say that in total, while the two countries 
were waiting to join the EEC, and during both membership, the conflict lasted 29 years 
 Civil Rights Activism, the battle of Bogside, and the Arrival of the British Army. In: The Troubles. Jeff 18
Wallenfeldt. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. London. May 14, 2019 [online][date of access: 12/12/2019] 
Available at: https://www.britannica.com/event/The-Troubles-Northern-Ireland-history
 Irish Republican Army. Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, Paul Arthur. Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. London. 19
December 16. 2019. [online][date of access: 30/12/2019] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/
Irish-Republican-Army
 WALLENFELDT, JEFF, op. cit 120
The Good Friday Agreement (The Belfast Agreement). UK Government, Northern Ireland's Government 21
and Ireland's Government. Belfast. 1998 [online][date of access: 05/02/2020] Available at: https://www.d-
fa.ie/media/dfa/alldfawebsitemedia/ourrolesandpolicies/northernireland/good-friday-agreement.pdf
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long. Is necessary to say that, searching for information about the relations between the 
UK and Ireland, the best source of information that was found were the Irish and Eng-
lish people. The relations between the two countries were harsh, because in the Eu-
ropean Parliament (EP) we could saw in the same hemicycle, the political parties from 
the UK, and, the political parties from Ireland. We can think at the same time, that the 
situation already described was not a situation that could lead to a very cordial plenary 
session. Nonetheless we have to point that during the IRA’s existence, Sinn Fein was the 
political wing of the paramilitary organisation. Therefore, the fact that a political party 
were “promoting” into a certain point the violent acts in the territory of a Member State, 
we cannot think that this situation was the ideal one into the European Parliament in 
terms of relation between the two countries.  
The main aims that the two countries had was, find a peaceful solution to the 
armed conflict they had in Northern Ireland. This solution was born in 1998, with the 
signing of The Good Friday Agreement (as the Catholics say) or Belfast Agreement (as 
the Protestants say). So, although the relations between the two countries were, compli-
cated in the decade of the 90’s, with the Agreement they found a middle way. 
In terms of the relation, we have to highlight the signature of the GFA. That was 
the breaking point when the relations between the two countries reached the cordiality 
point where they are now. But, can the Brexit’s process break the Agreement? That 
Agreement was a very important step for the resolution of the conflict at a political lev-
el. And the fact that this Agreement was signed during the membership in the EEC/EU 
is important, too. The principles of the EU are based in a pacific relation between the 
Member States and until the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the relations between 
both countries were cordial. But since the referendum, the relations between UK and 
Ireland went every day to a worst situation, due to the possible consequences of the ef-
fective Brexit over Ireland. Some political figures from Ireland (as John Bruton, ex-
Prime Minister of Ireland in the 90’s) think that the Brexit will affect into a mid-long 
term the Irish economy to a higher level than the British.  22
2.2.1. The position of the EU in the Northern Irish conflict. The PEACE Pro-
gramme.  
The influence of the European Union in The Troubles became a fact in 1989, 4 
years after an International Fund for Ireland (IFI) was created (1985), to obtain in-
ternational aid to tackle with the Troubles. In 1993, the European Commission made a 
declaration, in which said that the institution wanted to support the peace process in 
Northern Ireland. This support (in a more active way) only came with the invitation of 
the involved governments.  
The reaction of the EU was a late one. The Single European Act (SEA) in 1986 
and the Maastricht Treaty were the events that marked a breaking point of the EU’s re-
action to the conflict. With Maastricht, in 1992, was created the EU as we know it 
  El Reino Unido ha puesto a Irlanda en una situación casi imposible. Carlos Fresneda. El Mundo. 4th 22
December 2017. Derry (Northern Ireland)  [online][date of access: 11th March 2020] Available at: https://
www.elmundo.es/internacional/2017/12/04/5a23df91268e3ea1208b45dd.html
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nowadays, and, in order to create a stable political union, we have to imagine that be 
active in the solution of the problem would be a good step to take for the EU.  23
The 14th December 1993, took place a joint political declaration from the 
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and the UK’s PM John Major. In this declaration, both lead-
ers pointed that, this declaration established a good peace process framework. Thus dec-
laration came after a very long and complex period of negotiations that started in the 
late 80’s between the Irish and British Governments, the collaboration of the Elected 
President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton and the population of the Repub-
lic and Northern Ireland . 24
The European Commission, in a communication to the Council and to the Par-
liament of the 7th December 1994, the European Commission proposed a “specific sup-
port programme for Northern Ireland […].” This support programme, would be the 
framework where the peace process in Northern Ireland would lie, because, as we al-
ready know, both Ireland and UK were Member States of the EEC/EU since 1973: 
“On the basis of these considerations the Commission proposes that 
a specific support programme for Northern Ireland be established 
on the following elements: […] 
(ii) The commitment of the two governments to take the best advan-
tage of the new situation is finalising and implementing their opera-
tional programmes under the existing Community Initiatives […]”.  25
In 1995, was approved the PEACE I programme. Furthermore, this programme 
was extended with the PEACE II programme (1999-2006) and PEACE III programme. 
(2007-2013). Nowadays, the fourth PEACE programme (2014-2020) is applying in the 
territory. The main objectives of this programme are to “Cohesion between communities 
involved in the conflict in Northern Ireland and the border counties of Ireland” and 
“Economic and social stability”.  26
 We can see that the EU took (and still have) a very important place in the Peace 
Process from Northern Ireland. This is a fact that, taking into account both countries 
were Member States of the EU, the institutional, economic and social support that the 
 FILIBI LÓPEZ, IGOR. La Unión Europea como factor de paz. Agenda Internacional. Año XI, nº 22. 23
2005. [online] [ date of access: 7th April 2020] Available at: https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?
codigo=6302519
 GONZÁLEZ RUBIO BABILONIA, RAFAEL ENRIQUE. Análisis del proceso de paz en Irlanda del Norte. 24
Reflexiones sobre su alcance para el abordaje del proceso de paz colombiano.. Universidad Católica de 
Colombia- Universitá degli Studi di Salerno. Santa Fe de Bogotá. 2015. [online] [ date of access: 10th 
April 2020] Available at: https://repository.ucatolica.edu.co/bitstream/10983/2693/1/
AN%C3%81LISIS%20DEL%20PROCESO%20DE%20PAZ%20EN%20IRLANDA%20DEL%20NORTE..
pdf
 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. A Special Support 25
Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland. Commission of the European  Communi-
ties. Brussels. 7th December 1994. COM (94) 607 final. [ online] [date of access:  10th April 2020] Avail-
a b l e a t : h t t p s : / / e u r - l e x . e u r o p a . e u / l e g a l - c o n t e n t / E N / T X T / P D F / ?
uri=CELEX:51994DC0607&qid=1586607925503&from=EN
 See the European Parliament factsheet about the PEACE programme here: https://www.europarl.eu26 -
ropa.eu/ftu/pdf/en/FTU_3.1.9.pdf
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Union gave, and still give to the peace process, although it came a little bit late, in a part 
of the Northern Ireland territory, the programme gives good results. 
Unfortunately, at a social level the quarrels between Catholics and Protestants 
still nowadays present, especially in Northern Ireland. Part of the population of North-
ern Ireland consider the other part as different to them, and vice versa. Even there is a 
feeling of fear between the protestant populations of Northern Ireland because, actually 
in the current days, the population of Catholics has surpassed the population of Protes-
tants for the first time in history. Now, “UK” is the minority in Northern Ireland .  27
2.3. Conclusion to this section. 
The accession of Ireland and the UK in the EEC entailed an improvement of the 
economic situation of the two countries, an improvement of the trade conditions and 
also the beginning of the resolution of the armed conflict, that implied the starting of the 
improvement of the relations of the two countries. In addition, the entrance of both 
countries to the Community created a benefit to the Original Member States in terms of 
trade.  Two more countries in the EEC implied the expansion of the Customs Union and 
the Internal Market, the rising of the contributions to the EEC budget and the rising of 
the own EEC budget. Is Ireland ready for a hard Brexit or the EU must take action to 
prevent to all costs, a disordered exit of the UK with the intention to protect the GFA, 
instead of the UK and continue to have a cordial relation with Ireland? The answer 
would come in the following months, when the new negotiation period begin to take 
action. 
Certainly, if we compare the two States and their economic potential, Ireland 
would be the most affected of the two countries. Recall that since a long time ago, the 
relations (political and social) between UK and Ireland were cordial but always walking 
in thin ice. We cannot believe that the current British attitude (with Boris Johnson as 
PM) is the best for having a good relations with the Irish government and population. 
We are describing a situation in which one part of the parts involved does not seem in-
terested in which would be the economic and trade consequences of their exit of the 
Union.  
 Brexit and Sinn Fein's success boost talk of Irish unification. The Economist. 13th February 2020. 27
London. [online][date of access: 16th February 2020] Available at: https://www.economist.com/briefing/
2020/02/13/brexit-and-sinn-feins-success-boost-talk-of-irish-unification
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3. BREXIT.  
Brexit is the word used by the Eurosceptic civil society regarding the exit of UK 
from the EU, therefore it was created by Peter Wilding (a pro-Europe activist) in 2012 . 28
But before the Brexit as we know it, in 1975 (only two years later of the addition to the 
EEC) there was a referendum celebrated, with the Labour Party in power (Harold Wil-
son was the Prime Minister). The option to remain won. In this section we are going to 
analyse briefly what was the route that the UK took before celebrating the referendum, 
the referendum (and its results), what is the Brexit, the timing, the general and specific 
points of negotiations (regarding the Irish border) and the backstop proposal, as one of 
the propositions that the EU made to the UK, trying to solve the Irish border issue. 
3.1. The path before Brexit’s referendum  29
We are going to study briefly the circumstances that occurred before the Brexit 
referendum, since we can consider them of great importance because these circum-
stances established the central points of the Eurosceptic and the political campaign, 
even the UK demands regarding the eventual remaining of the UK in the EU. 
In 2013, David Cameron declared that, if the Conservative Party would win the 
General Elections in 2015 with absolute majority, he would call the population of the 
UK to a referendum about their membership in the EU.  The Eurosceptic movement in 
the UK, led by Nigel Farage and the UKIP was increasing their influence into the EP. In 
2014, the UKIP won the European elections with a 26’77% of the UK’s votes. In 2015, 
Cameron won the General Elections (with this absolute majority) and, even he was not 
agree with the Brexit idea, the meetings with the Council of the EU of the time, Donald 
Tusk, began.  30
The 10th November 2015, David Cameron wrote a letter to Donald Tusk, regard-
ing the 4 spheres that the UK considered proper to reform in the EU: Economic Gover-
nance, Competitiveness, Sovereignty and Immigration.  31
Regarding the first sphere (Economic Governance), the ideas of Cameron lied in 
the fact that in the EU are “effectively two sorts of members of the European Union. 
There are Euro members and non-Euro members”. This statement shows us the duplici-
ty of realities within the European Union and its Member States regarding the currency 
sphere. As we know, the UK was not a Eurozone Member. One of the most interesting 
principles that Cameron putted down the letter was: “Any changes the Eurozone decides 
to make, such as the creation of a banking union, must be voluntary for non-Euro coun-
 Origen y evolución de la palabra “Brexit”, por el British Council. British Council. 31st January 2020. 28
Madrid. [online][date of access: 12th March 2020] Available at: https://www.britishcouncil.es/sobre-noso-
tros/prensa/origen-evolucion-palabra-brexit
 See the timeline of the negotiations pre-referendum here: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/29
eu-uk-after-referendum/2016-uk-settlement-process-timeline/
 Cronología de las relaciones del Reino Unido con la Unión Europea. La Vanguardia. 15th June 2016. 30
[online][date of Access: 5th April 2020] Available at: https://www.lavanguardia.com/politica/
20160615/402524795407/cronologia-de-las-relaciones-del-reino-unido-con-la-union-europea.html
 See at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/31
file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf
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tries, never compulsory.” This is a demand that is reasonable. If there is a different 32
reality for some of the members of a club, the club cannot apply the same conditions to 
all of its members. Regarding the application of such an action as a banking union, this 
act would be harmful for the States that are not Eurozone members. If you do not have 
the same currency as the others, the steps that the others could take, would not be an 
obligation for the ones that do not have the same monetary situation. 
In terms of Sovereignty, the most important point that we have noticed is the 
Cameron’s demand regarding “[…] end Britain’s obligation to work towards an “ever 
closer union” as set out in the Treaty.” This is one of the principal goals of the EU. The 
fact that this demand, if we study the principal goals of the EU, totally breaks with the 
objectives of the Union. If one of that objectives, as Jean Claude Juncker (President of 
the European Commission in those times) said, was creating the EU of Nations, this 
statement would make unable the EU to create this total political union. The sovereignty 
has been one of the most controversial assets that the UK had discussed since their ac-
cession to the EEC in 1973. This asset is formed by two big scopes: Politic and mone-
tary sovereignty.  33
Finally, the Immigration sphere. The free movement of people was always a 
right open to discussion in the UK. And when the Schengen Agreements were negotiat-
ed in the late 80’s, UK did not sign them (either Ireland). During the Brexit’s campaign, 
one of the slogans that the Pro-Brexit parties repeated the most was Take back control. 
This control was regarding the borders. In the letter from Cameron to Tusk one of the 
arguments that UK puts on the table for being skeptical about the free movement of 
people is the “abuse […].”  UK was always a country that had their reservations regard-
ing this principle of the EEC/EU. We cannot consider that in terms of immigration the 
UK had lost their sovereignty at all, because, as we said before, the UK never signed the 
Schengen Agreements, and the passports controls among all the citizens (even from the 
EU itself) were applied.  34
These were the main points that the UK put on a table of negotiation. The reform 
of this principles, Cameron said that would “provide a fresh and lasting settlement for 
our membership of the European Union”. Recall that one of the pillar rights of the EU is 
the free movement of people that entered into force with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. 
The interest of the UK may not be the interest of theEU as a whole. 
The 2nd February 2016, Donald Tusk published a proposal for a new regime for 
the UK. In this date, he gave an answer to the UK’s proposals from the letter of the 
Prime Minister David Cameron to Tusk. The new agreement that Cameron was seek35 -
ing for the UK, was dependent on a referendum regarding their membership in the EU.  
 See Footnote number 31.32
 See Footnote number 31.33
 See Footnote number 31.34
The timeline of the negotiations in the previous times to the Brexit Referendum is available here: 35
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/eu-uk-after-referendum/2016-uk-settlement-process-timeline/
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3.2. The referendum 
In a first place, this referendum was promised to be celebrated in January 2013, 
but, the reality was that this referendum took place 3 years and a half later, in July 2016. 
In between those years, the issue was putted in a box and condemned to be part of the 
political debate sometimes, but not in a very important place in the Westminster sched-
ule. But, the fact was that Cameron, as we saw in the previous section, won the General 
Election with a majority that he would never expected.  36
The withdrawal right always existed in the EEC/EU, but we must remember 
that, before the Lisbon Treaty , there wasn’t established any mechanism to leave the 37
Union (but the possibility always existed), so it was included the article 50 that says as 
follows: 
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with 
its own constitutional requirements.  
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council 
of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, 
the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out 
the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its fu-
ture relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accor-
dance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a 
qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.  
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notif-
ication referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement 
with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.  
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council 
or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not partici-
pate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions con-
cerning it. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)
(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall 
be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.  
We must think like the writers and the politicians thought at the time of the in-
clusion of this article. At first, this article was wrote to exist, but no to be invoked or 
applied in the future. Although we pointed before the lack of withdrawing mechanisms, 
the fact was, that always was possible to leave the Community, but, the truth is that, 
anyone thought that one Member State would leave.  
 CRAIG, Paul P., Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts (July 11, 2016). European Law Review August 2016; Ox36 -
ford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 45/2016. [online] [date of access: 19th April 2020] Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2807975
 Tratado de Lisboa, por el que se modifica el Tratado de la Unión Europea y el Tratado constitutivo de 37
la Comunidad Europea, firmado en Lisboa el 13 de diciembre de 2007. Bruselas. 17 de diciembre de 
2007. núm. DOUE: 2007/C306/01. ISSN: 1725-244X. [en línea][fecha de acceso: 09/02/2020] Disponi-
ble en: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ES/TXT/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC
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The UK was, since their entrance into the EEC, the most Eurosceptic country 
inside the Community. In the UK, there was always a large sector of the population that 
considered the EEC as an institution that was taking away the British sovereignty (polit-
ical and economic). Even Margaret Thatcher claimed more sovereignty for the UK in 
her speech when she said we want our money back, in the European Council summit in 
Dublin, the 29th November 1979.  After this summit, UK achieved the refund of part of 38
their EU- destined budget in the so called British check. 
So, the first aim of the inclusion of this article was, for all the Eurosceptic group 
(where the main political opinion from the UK were included), to maintain the idea that 
the European Union is only an International Organisation and, put aside the idea of a 
federalist union between the Member States.  39
The principal political party that was member of the Leave side were, first of all, 
UKIP. This was the only political party that was not divided in their position regarding 
Brexit. Therefore, inside the Leave group, the different visions within the political par-
ties were so evident. In the Conservative Party, we can find some interesting divisions, 
such as the David Cameron’s and Boris Johnson’s positions regarding the Brexit. 
Cameron, although he was who called the people to the ballots, during the campaign 
was in the Remain side. On the contrary, Johnson was always a member of the Leave 
group. 
 In the Labour Party there were also some divisions, in this case, because of the 
position’s strength of the leaders of the Party. Jeremy Corbyn, who was a defender of 
the remaining in the EU, never made a string declaration against the withdrawal from 
the Union, as some of the members of the Labour Party said.  40
Later on, in the 23rd of June 2016 (after a lot of negotiations between the Eu-
ropean institutions and the UK’s government), a second referendum was celebrated in 
UK regarding the same question. That time, the option to leave won.  
 BREXIT: We want our money back! Margaret Thatcher already warned EU exactly 40 years ago!. 38
Productiehuis EU. 29th November 2019 [online] [date of access: 12th March 2020] Available at: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=rNLVeAQvzn8
 GALLARDO VALERIO, A. El derecho  de retirada en la Unión Europea: teoría y puesta en práctica con 39
el Brexit. Universidad de la Rioja. 2018. [online] [date of Access: 19th April 2020]. Available at: https://
biblioteca.unirioja.es/tfe_e/TFE004134.pdf
 CASTAÑO, PABLO. El Brexit divide a los partidos británicos.. 24th December 2018. El Cuarto Poder. 40
[online] [ date of Access: 13th April 2020] Available at: https://www.cuartopoder.es/internacional/
2018/12/24/el-brexit-divide-a-los-partidos-britanicos/
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Source: Own elaboration using the data in the EL MUNDO website . 41
As we can see in the previous table, the total results of the referendum on Brexit 
in the whole UK, the victory of the LEAVE group was not as wide as they would prefer, 
but the fact is that this option won the referendum. For that reason, months later, some 
of the politicians and MP’s that voted for REMAIN demanded a second referendum on 
the membership in the EU. 
The Prime Minister of the time, Theresa May invoked the article 50 after know-
ing the results of the referendum (we must remember that David Cameron, the prede-
cessor of May was who called to the population to the referendum) the 29th March 2017 
via letter to Donald Tusk. It was in that time when the second period of negotiations be-
gan. The Brexit meetings began between the UK’s government (led by PM May and her 
Secretary on Brexit, David Davis), and the European Commission (lead by Michel 
Barnier).  42
In the current Brexit, there were two periods of negotiations: The first one, be-
gan the 25th June 2015 with a meeting between David Cameron (UK’s PM) and Donald 
TERRITORY LEAVE REMAIN
UNITED KINGDOM 51.9% 48.1%
ENGLAND 53.4% 46.6%
NORTHERN IRELAND 44.2% 55.8%
SCOTLAND 38% 62%
WALES 52.5% 47.5%
 https://www.elmundo.es/internacional/2016/06/24/576ce7d5e5fdeaf4638b4632.html41
 Letter from UK’s PM Theresa May to Donald Tusk. 29th March 2017. London. [online] [date of access: 42
16th February 2020] Available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/XT-20001-2017-INIT/en/
pdf
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Tusk. The purpose of that meeting was to establish the guidelines to make effective a 
referendum in UK relating to the EU membership. The Brexit process in its first phase 
of negotiations was a process that included the participation of the great European insti-
tutions in different stages and positions. It was explained in general terms by an info-
graphic of the Council of the European Union of the year 2017. 
3.3. Negotiations’ timing. 
The procedure begins with the invocation of the aforementioned article 50 to the 
Council. Subsequently, the Council publishes the guidelines that the group of EU nego-
tiators must follow in the course of them. The Council, authorizing the opening of the 
negotiations adopts the lines of action of the body designated to carry out the negotia-
tion tasks which in the case of Brexit, the reins were taken by the European Commis-
sion with Michel Barnier as head of the community negotiations team. 
 
Source: European Council 
In the framework of the process of negotiations between the two teams, both the 
Council and EP are present in the background. Both the Council and EP offer guidance 
and various types of contribution, such as taking more measures to achieve the objec-
tives of the negotiation. 
 
Source: European Council 
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In the British negotiating team, the British Parliament is the body that gives final 
approval to the agreements reached with the community team. Recall that if there have 
been so many extensions to the application of Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, it has 
been due to the reluctance of the House of Commons that it has blatantly rejected cer-
tain agreements that the Theresa May government managed to reach with the Michel 
Barnier team. One such agreement that was rejected by British MPs was the so-called 
backstop agreement, which is explained in the next sections of this chapter. 
By the time the negotiations are over, the exit agreement must be ratified in two 
instances: The community instance in the EP and the British instance in the House of 
Commons. 
The two chambers must approve the agreement, otherwise there could be two 
options: the first, which was the one that was happening, would be the extension or ex-
tension of the application of article 50; and the second, that there be the possibility of a 
Brexit without a framework agreement on which to work.  The 19th of June 2017, the 43
negotiations between the UK and the EU Commission started in its first round. 
3.4. General Points of negotiation in Brexit 
In the letter sent by May to Tusk (see footnote number 42), the PM established 
the points that the UK proposed for the discussions between the parts involved, but we 
are going to talk about 3 out of the 6 points of the letter. The first one, talks about the 
UK-EU cooperation in terms of trade. In this part, the UK is aware that the British com-
panies that will trade with EU companies will have to be aligned with some legislation 
that are no more applying to them as a Member State. In this case, this idea can be relat-
ed to the sixth point of the letter that talks about a Free Trade Agreement between the 
UK and the European Union. This is a point that it would be a good one to develop. We 
cannot consider effective to subdue the UK tot a regulations that a priori are only ap-
plicable to the Member States, therefore, the fact the UK puts on the table the option of 
a Free Trade Agreement with the EU is a good perspective to preserve the good rela-
tions among the involved parts. 
 The other point we have to consider is the fifth point of the May’s letter. The 
unique relationship between UK and the Republic of Ireland. In the next section we are 
going to talk deeply about this subject but, as an introduction, the main matters that 
Westminster putted on the table regarding this sphere were the avoidance of a hard bor-
der between Ireland and Northern Ireland, the maintenance of the Common Travel Area 
(CTA), and above all this points, the preservation pf the Peace process in the territory 
and the protection of the Good Friday Agreement. 
 Infografía. Proceso del Brexit. Consejo de la Unión Europea. 2017. Bruselas. [online][date of access: 43
15th March 2020] Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/infographics/brexit-process/
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The main points to negotiate between the UK and the European Union were 
agreed by the involved parts in it, and they coincide if we take the letter from PM May 
and the points that Michel Barnier exposed in his speech after the first round of negotia-
tions:   44
“- EU citizens rights. 
• Single financial settlement. 
• Irish Border. 
- Another issues .” 45
As Barnier said in his speech, the main goal of Europe is “to make sure that the with-
drawal of the UK happens in an orderly manner”, so, the structure of negotiations were, 
1 week of negotiation each month. In total, there were 7 round of negotiations, and, be-
tween them, we can point some interesting meetings and agreements, as such as the 
meeting between Donald Tusk and the Irish Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Leo Varadkar, 
in December 2017 and the publication of the first Draft of Withdrawal Agreement in 
February 2018.  46
That rounds were related to the first phase of negotiations, the phase that would 
establish “the game rules” between the EU and the UK during the negotiations and the 
points that would need to be developed a posteriori in the Draft Agreement.  
Two of the most interesting negotiation round are the fourth and the fifth. In this 
two rounds, we can point that the most important matter of discussion was, inevitably, 
the Irish border. Why is the Irish border the most controversial point of the Brexit nego-
tiations list? The answer is simple. The establishment of a physical border between 
these two jurisdictions is something that is obvious that, with Brexit will occur but, even 
the UK will be categorized as a third State, they do not want to happen . So, the main 47
issue here is, find the perfect solution to be applied in a long-term period. And, I consid-
er that part of the best solution is to maintain the CTA. 
 Speech by Michel Barnier, the European Commission's Chief Negotiator, following the first round of 44
Article 50 negotiations with the UK. European Commission. Brussels. 19 June 2017. [online] [date of 
access: 01/02/2020] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/
SPEECH_17_1704
 This issues were, mostly, the relocation of the EU agencies established in UK, the European Medicines 45
Agency (now in Amsterdam) and the European Banking Authority (now its Headquarters are located in 
Paris)
 The timeline of the Brexit negotiations is available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-46
uk-after-referendum/
 I understand that, the main thought of "no border" between a EU Member State and a third State is 47
something that goes against logic, unless you have an agreement, as the CTA.
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3.5. Specific points of negotiation regarding Ireland. 
Besides the general points of negotiation regarding Brexit as a whole matter, in 
the Irish issue, they had obviously, their own points of negotiation. This matters of ne-
gotiation were all based in protecting the GFA, and, to avoid the establishment of a 
physical border, as well as preserving the CTA. This frontier is, in the Irish and North-
ern Irish mentality, segregation and differentiation between families, and obviously, dif-
ferences in the opportunities. 
So, in the fourth and fifth round of negotiation , the hot point was Ireland. The 48
28th of September took place the fourth negotiations round, but, the guidelines  for that 49
meeting, were made the 20th of September. The main points of the meeting were, first of 
all, the protection of the GFA and the Peace Process, and secondly, the CTA .  50
That arrangement has its base in the Good Friday Agreement and the historical 
background between both States. We are going to make a brief excursus and talk a little 
bit about the CTA. This is a long-standing arrangement between Ireland and the UK that 
allows both citizenships (Irish and British) to move without limitations between the two 
States and that arrangement is recognized by the EU legislation. The basic principle on 
which this Agreement lies is that both nationalities (Irish and British) have the same op-
portunities in terms of settlement and job in both territories. The origins of this arran-
gement between UK and Ireland are in 1922, when the Free Irish State was created, but 
during the years (1949, 1958, 2008) this arrangement was still operating in the territory 
of Ireland and UK. The principal rights that the Irish and UK citizens have regarding 
this arrangement are, the right to access to education, jobs, healthcare and settlement. 
If we analyse the points inside the GFA section in the Guiding principles, we can 
assume that, even all of them are important, the ones that are the pillars of the negotia-
tion are “the avoidance of a hard border; North-South Cooperation;  Rights, Safeguards 
and Equality of Opportunities; Citizenship rights”, as them were the pillars of the 
Agreement in 1998. 
The round did not make any remarkable progress, as the previous and the next, 
the fifth, as we see that, as Barnier said in his speech after the fifth meeting, they didn’t 
take “great steps forward”, but, in the area that we are interested, the few steps that they 
took were about the continuation of the CTA, the North-South cooperation and the prin-
 Press statement by Michel Barnier following the fifth round of Article 50 negotiations with the United 48
Kingdom. European Commission. 12th October 2017. Brussels. [online][date of access: 6th of February 
2020] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_17_3921
 Guiding principles for the Dialogue on Ireland/Northern Ireland. European Commission. Brussels. 21 49
September 2017. [on line][date of access: 01/02/2020] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/
sites/beta-political/files/dialogue_ie-ni.pdf
 IRELAND'S GOVERNMENT. Common Travel Area. Information Note from Ireland to the Article 50 Work50 -
ing Group.. 7 September 2017. Dublin. [online][date of access: 06/02/2020] Available at: https://merrion-
street.ie/en/EU-UK/
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ciples included in the guidelines published in September before the fourth round of ne-
gotiations.  51
In March, 19th 2018,  there was published a Draft Agreement on the withdrawal 
of the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the EU-
RATOM. In fact, it was the first Draft Agreement published after the seven negotiation 
rounds. That Draft is related to the Joint Report  published the 8th of December 2017, 52
because, in this Report, is where we see, without see it expressly, the idea of 
“backstop”.  
Specifically, in its paragraphs 49, 50 and 51 of the Joint Report(but mostly in 
paragraph 49), we see that the option of maintaining Northern Ireland in the Internal 
Market and Customs Union is on the table, always with the GFA as a legal base. Literal-
ly we can read in paragraph 49: 
“[…]In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full 
alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, 
now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy 
and the protection of the 1998 Agreement”. 
That was, at the time, one of the most controversial point of the negotiations. 
Although the EU Commission’s team and the UK Government team agreed in the back-
stop as a ultima ratio, and this spirit was in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,  in 
the House of Commons and the Northern Ireland Assembly, no everybody agreed in that 
idea.  
3.6. The “Backstop” proposal 
The justification for the analysis of this topic is the importance of the conse-
quences that would result from the application of the backstop. We are talking about a 
serious proposal that was given by the negotiating teams. We are not only talking about 
consequences at the legal, economic and commercial level, but consequences at the so-
cial level. We have to remember the political-social conflict that has existed for decades 
(although now in a stand-by situation) on the island. 
We can understand that the backstop proposal is a proposal to keep the GFA in-
tact. It is the cornerstone of the current relations between Ireland, Northern Ireland and 
 That situation led to Mr. Barnier to discard to recommend to the European Council the starting of the 51
negotiation on future relations.
 Joint Report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on 52
progress during the phase 1 of negotiations under article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom’s orderly with-
drawal from the European Union. European Commission. Brussels. 8th December 2017. [online] [date of 
access: 4 February 2020] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/joint-report-negotia-
tors-european-union-and-united-kingdom-government-progress-during-phase-1-negotiations-under-arti-
cle-50-teu-united-kingdoms-orderly-withdrawal-european-union_en
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the UK, and from the beginning of the negotiations and Brexit per se, they always want-
ed to protect the agreement at all costs. 
3.6.1. Who proposed the backstop and definition. 
This option was proposed by the EU Commission team and the UK’s Govern-
ment team, in the meetings that made the Joint Report, and after a letter that the PM of 
that time, Theresa May, sent to Donald Tusk, the 19th March 2018 . 53
What does it mean? Or if we want to reformulate the question: What does the 
backstop mean? The backstop mean that, unless the negotiators find a useful agreement 
for Northern Ireland and Ireland, or during the negotiations after the effective UK’s 
withdraw from the EU, Northern Ireland would remain part of the Internal Market and 
Customs Union and it will be a beneficiary of European funds and Programmes as 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  54
The 11th June 2018, was published an infographic , were the backstop proposal 55
was exposed. In that document we can see, how the backstop would work. 
3.6.2. Implications of the backstop for Northern Ireland. 
First of all, recall that, this proposal, was created to protect the GFA, of the princi-
pal point of negotiation of the Irish issue. 
Now, to understand what would be the implications of the backstop, is proper to 
analyse briefly, regarding the infographic previously mentioned, how it would work. As 
the infographic tells us, the backstop would imply an open border between the two Ire-
lands, and, with this open border, Northern Ireland (and the whole UK) would be part of 
the Internal Market and: 
• “EU tariffs and rules of origin apply to non-EU goods. 
• EU VAT and excise rules. 
• EU product safety and quality standards (e.g. food. chemicals and 
consumer goods). 
• EU rules on animal health and welfare.” 
 Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_53 -
data/file/691625/PM_Pres_Tusk_19.03.2018_001.pdf
 MCMAHON J.A.  Avoiding the Backstop Solution: Northern Ireland and the EU post-Brexit.. University 54
College Dublin. UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies. Research Paper 
No.05/2018. [online][date of access: 20 November 2019] Available at: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3155145 
 Infographic on the EU's "backstop" proposal. European Commission. 11 June 2018. [online][date of 55
access: 20 December 2019] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/info-
graphic_on_the_eu_backstop_proposal.pdf
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In terms of checks on the goods, the only checks that would exist at ports, like 
Galway (EU), Dublin (EU), Belfast (UK), Cork (EU), Londonderry/Derry (UK); and 
airports.  
 
Source: European Commission (EU) 
The main implication that I can draw from this proposal is, first of all, the inef-
fective departure from the whole of the UK. 
Northern Ireland then, would it have two types of legislation to follow and com-
ply with (The EU legislation and the UK’s)? The backstop proposal at no time speaks of 
duplication of legislation, but it is something that I find important to highlight. The via-
bility of an agreement is that all the points are developed and that there are no legal 
loopholes that could lead to misapplication or that the agreement is left on paper. 
It is evident that the situation of avoiding the hard border between the two Ire-
lands would be covered by the backstop, but, as the infographic explains, this would be 
in force in the event that a feasible solution is not found between the parties involved or 
if it is being negotiating at the time of application. As it was mentioned before, the 
backstop would be an option that would be effective after an agreement. What does it 
mean? The fact that the backstop would be effective with an agreement means that, for 
example, if Northern Ireland would like to finish the agreement, the involved parts (UK, 
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Ireland and the EU) would must negotiate the withdrawal agreement on the backstop of 
Northern Ireland.  
3.6.3. Viability of the proposal. 
As it was said previously, the main implication of this proposal is the problem of 
the ineffective withdrawal of the UK from the EU and eventually, the duplicity of legal 
systems applicable to Northern Ireland. For that reason, is correct to talk about the via-
bility of this proposal and what are some of the proposals from the Political Parties in 
Northern Ireland. Analysing the infographic of the European Commission, is not very 
realistic to think that the backstop would be viable because, first of all, we cannot belie-
ve that the parts involved would like to negotiate again a withdrawal of an agreement 
when actually the first withdraw is not fully effective, so we must agree with the opi-
nions of the slanderers of the backstop. 
In Westminster Palace, a big number of Tories (Conservative Party) didn’t like 
the idea of maintaining Northern Ireland under the Internal Market and Customs Union 
Laws while the rest of the UK was leaving the EU. They felt that this situation could 
give an image of the UK never leaving the EU at all.  
Either in Northern Ireland the idea was good (at least for some of the political 
parties). The DUP (Democratic Unionist Party, pro-UK) thought like the Conservatives 
aforementioned. They said that, if the backstop option would enter into force, Northern 
Ireland would be under European regulations, and that would be something in favour of 
the reunification of the Island of Ireland, and, also, the UK would have to agree with the 
EU the end of the backstop with more rounds of negotiation . 56
In the other hand, the other political parties in Northern Ireland, as Sinn Fein, 
Social Democratic and Labour Party, Alliance Party and the Ulster Unionist Party, they 
gave their visions and positions about a Special Status for Northern Ireland.  
Sinn Fein, for example, talks about remain as part of the internal market, the 
Union customs and be part of the funding programmes and part of the European Parlia-
ment as part of the Irish delegation, and obviously, the CTA should be maintained . We 57
must recall that Sinn Fein is the party that has an ambition of a reunification of 
Ireland . 58
 Brexit: 5 preguntas para entender por qué la frontera de Irlanda es crucial en el acuerdo entre la UE y 56
UK. BBC News. London. 11 December 2018. [online] [date of access: 01 February 2020] Available at: 
https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-internacional-46513736
SINN FEINN. The Case for the North to Achieve Special Status within the EU.. Available at: https://57
www.sinnfein.ie/files/2016/The_Case_For_The_North_To_Achieve_Special_Designated_Status_With-
in_The_EU
 And with the astonishing results in the latest polls in Ireland, the idea of a reunified Ireland is again on 58
the table and it is part of the political debate.
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The Social Democratic and Labour Party’s position consists in maintaining the 
membership of the Internal Market and continuing to be beneficiary of EU funding pro-
grammes . The Alliance Party agrees on the ideas from Sinn Fein and Labour Party, but 59
adding the collaboration of the UK’s Government in Non-EU Foreign and Defence Pol-
icy . The Ulster Unionist Party , although is a pro-UK party, in their manifesto we can 60 61
observe that the free access to the EU’s Single Market for Northern Ireland (maintaining 
that territory in the Single Market) that could be seen as a possibility for the UK to be a 
de facto member of the Single Market, without necessity to be a de iure member. 
This proposal does not help to protect the GFA and the Peace Process. Probably, 
a part of the population of Northern Ireland would feel isolated from the rest of the UK, 
and, with the delicate background that existed in the territory of Northern Ireland, the 
proposal would re-establish and reopen old wounds that, in this moment, are still heal-
ing, because the backstop is not only about trade, customs or legal systems. The back-
stop has a wider vision, reaching the social and cultural spectre of the population. 
In the end, the backstop proposal was rejected in the House of Commons. 
 SDLP. Securing our Future in Europe.. Available at: https://www.sdlp.ie/site/assets/files/43037/sdlp_-59
_securing_our_future_in_europe.pdf
ALLIANCE PARTY. How to mitigate the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland.. Available at: https://60
d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/allianceparty/pages/3656/attachments/original/1549570675/how-to-mit-
igate-the-impact-of-brexit-on-northern-ireland.pdf?1549570675
ULSTER UNIONIST PARTY.  A vision for Northern Ireland outside the EU. Available at: https://uup.org/61
our-vision/policies#a-vision-for-northern-ireland-outside-the-eu
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4. THE GIANTS CAUSEWAY. THE SITUATION OF THE IRISH BORDER AF-
TER THE BREXIT.  
 In this final section, we are going to analyse the current situation after the with-
drawal of the UK from the European Union. This is the point where we are going to an-
alyse the Implementation period, and several proposals from experts to solve the situa-
tion that could lead a hard Brexit in the Irish border. The first one, would be joining the 
European Economic Area (EEA); the second one, the creation of a Special Protocol on 
Trade for only Northern Ireland, as the one that was created for West and East Germany 
during the Cold War; the third one, the creation of a Common Custom Union between 
the two parts of the island and the fourth would be the reunification of the island. Also 
we are going to explain an experiment made on our own, as a possible solution to the 
issue. 
 This section is important, since it materializes in what many in the EU and in 
London itself thought would not come. The effective departure of the UK from the Eu-
ropean Union. Everything seemed to indicate that there would be more extensions of 
Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), but with the arrival of Boris 
Johnson as Prime Minister of United Kingdom, the process began to speed up (so much 
so that even Johnson threatened with Brexit without an agreement, since his main goal 
as PM was the effective exit of the UK from the EU). 
The 20th December 2020, the House of Commons had approved the withdrawal 
agreement. Accordingly to this fact, the European Union was, the next to ratify the 
Agreement in the EP.  The 24th January 2020, the EU signed the Withdrawal Agree62 -
ment, and the 29th January 2020, both the EP and the Council ratified the Agreement 
and the only left was to wait until the day of the effective withdrawal of the UK from 
the EU.  The 31st January 2020, the UK left the EU. The 1st February 2020 began what 63
is called the “transition period”. In that period, both parts of the negotiation, should 
make an agreement on how the future relations between the two entities would/will 
be.  64
 El Parlamento británico aprueba el acuerdo de retirada de Boris Johnson. La Vanguardia. Londres. 62
[online][date of Access: 17th March 2020] Available at: https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/
20191220/472369445367/parlamento-britanico-aprueba-acuerdo-retirada-boris-johnson-brexit-reino-
unido.html
 The Brexit’s timeline is available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/es/policies/eu-uk-after-referen63 -
dum/
EDGINGTON, TOM. Brexit: What is the transition period?. BBC News Analysis. 31st January 2020. BBC 64
News. [online][date of access: 15th  March 2020] available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-50838994 
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In March 2020, the new period of negotiations have started . The last day of 65
this phase is the 31st December 2020. There are two options for this period: The end of 
the relation with a full regulation of the system, or, on the other hand, the “hard Brexit”. 
This option implies the absence of any legal regulation of the future relations between 
the EU and the UK of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. 
4.1. The Implementation period. 
This transitional period entails that during the following months the UK, in or-
der to adapt progressively to the new situation, the European legal system is still in for-
ce in the British territory, the European citizens that are currently living in the UK 
would maintain their “European citizenship” rights and they will have the advantage of 
no requirements for the residence authorisations.  66
Another consequence of this period is the competence of the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) in the issues that the UK had submitted to the Court before Brexit, and 
also in the ones that it could be submitted during this period.  This period of time is so 67
important for the negotiations, because this negotiations would fix the path for the EU 
and the UK to follow during the future relations between them.  
That phase is necessary because, it was simply not feasible for the UK to leave 
the European Union without a safety net. The mere existence of the community acquis 
was sufficient to establish a regulated and orderly exit in any way. One of the most im-
portant assets the negotiation teams have to tackle is what has to be done in this transi-
tional period. The principal goal to achieve is a trade agreement.  
 In this days, due to the Covid-19 crisis, the negotiations are suspended sine die. We don’t know if the 65
pandemic situation will affect to the course of the transitional period. I think it would be favourable to the 
negotiation to implement as many extensions as necessary to create a beneficial agreement to both the 
European Union and the United Kingdom.  
 EDGINGTON, TOM. op. cit  62.66
 EDGINGTON, TOM. op. cit 62.67
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Source: BBC 
As we can see in this graphic, the vast majority of the UK trade goes to the EU, 
but, it is not the only asset the negotiation teams will have to address. There are a group 
of matters that both the EU and the UK will have to deal with, such as: “Law enforce-
ment, data sharing and security; aviation standards and safety; access to fishing wa-
ters; supplies of electricity and gas and Licensing and regulation of medicines.”  68
4.1.1. Finishing the Implementation period. 
This situation, only can end in three ways:  
1. The involved parts can achieve a trade agreement and it enters into force as soon 
as the transition period ends. This situation is the most desirable, because, it 
means that the negotiation teams had accomplished all their duties, and the rela-
tionship between the UK and the EU will be stable and profitable to both of 
them.  69
2. The transition period end with no-deal between the parts. Obviously, we can un-
derstand that this situation is the diametrically opposite to the first one. If we 
said before that the first aim of the negotiations in the transitional period is to 
create a trade agreement between UK and the EU, we have to consider this situa-
tion as discarded.  70
 EDGINGTON, TOM. op. cit  62.68
 EDGINGTON, TOM. op. cit  62.69
 EDGINGTON, TOM, op cit  62.70
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3. The transition period ands and the trade agreement is not finished yet. The prin-
cipal consequence of this situation would be that the current UK’s PM would 
agree with the EU an extension of the negotiations on the trade agreement. That 
circumstance is something that can happen, because, if we look back at the Arti-
cle 50 negotiations, we can assume that an extension of the agreement is some-
thing realistic.  71
4.1.2. Form of the transitional period’s negotiations. 
This transition period must have a legal basis. And the question here is, what 
form would take this transitional agreement and, in the end, which form would have the 
final agreement? 
The situation in which this transition leaves us and in which way it should be 
faced, is obviously complicated. Brexit itself is complicated. Let us remember that it is a 
totally new and unprecedented situation in the history of the European project. In a situ-
ation like this, we must understand that legal certainty is the fundamental pillar of any 
negotiation, and that legal certainty, we also understand that it must lie in the form that 
negotiations take and the instrument that will be used. 
In a paper written by Armstrong, Bell, Daly and Elliott, we are offered three of 
the options that were considered in October 2017 to face the transition period.  The 72
first one of all could have been an extension of Article 50 TEU, thus pushing the date of 
Brexit out (in fact, there was more than one extension).  The second one would be the 73
creation of an “Analogy” of the Accession Treaty (using Part 4 of the Treaty of Acces-
sion of the UK, Ireland and Denmark to the EEC in 1973).  The third one would be an 74
association agreement. Taking into account that from the beginning in the negotiating 
teams, the thought that the relationship between the European Union and the UK was 
going to be (and thus the teams would work) close and profitable, we should understand 
that, in principle, this it would be the instrument that should be used to regulate future 
relations between the parties.  75
As it is said before, the implementation of the transition period is a process that 
must be addressed with the use of instruments that provide the circumstance with the 
maximum possible legal security. 
 EDGINGTON, TOM, op cit  62.71
 ARMSTRONG, K and BELL, J. S. and DALY, P and ELLIOTT, M.C., Implementing Transition: How Would 72
it Work? (October 13, 2017). University of Cambridge Faculty of Law Research Paper No. 57/2017.[on-
line][date of access: 20th March 2020] Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3052328  
 ARMSTRONG, K and BELL, J. S. and DALY, P and ELLIOTT, M.C, op cit. 7073
 ARMSTRONG, K and BELL, J. S. and DALY, P and ELLIOTT, M.C, op cit. 7074
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Obviously, this transition, at the moment when the situation returns to normal 
(see footnote 65), will have to be addressed with new action times and new deadlines. It 
is manifest the impossibility that on December 31, 2020 there is an agreement signed to 
establish the regulation of future relations between the UK and the EU. Thus for now, 
the transition period is in a necessary stand-by. 
   
4.2. Possible solutions to the Irish border issue.  
The Irish border issue, is not an easy one to solve. And probably a solution is 
found but it should be adapted according to the times. In this part of the paper is where 
we will have on the table several solutions to the issue, and where we should find the 
answer to the first question we had asked ourselves in the introduction. 
The solutions that can be proposed must go through an agreement of all the par-
ties, including the EU Member States separately, since they too will have to adapt to a 
new time and new circumstances regarding the UK. If a long-term solution is found for 
the Irish border, it would be a triumph for the two negotiating parties, and that would 
imply that the only land carrier between the EU and the UK would be well regulated, 
without any crack. It is evident that the solution must protect the GFA at all costs, since 
it is the convergent point where all the parties involved in the previous armed conflict, 
plus the EU, feel comfortable and where relations between the Republic of Ireland and 
the UK found their point of understanding. 
The possible solutions that we will try to analyse are, on the one hand doctrinal 
or political and finally, an own option: The accession of the UK or even the accession of 
Northern Ireland to the EEA; the creation of a special Protocol in trade, similar to the 
one created for West Germany just before the reunification of the German country in 
1990; the possible reunification of the Island of Ireland; A Common No-Custom Area 
for only the Island of Ireland, and finally, the creation of an experiment of our own, 
titled The inverse contingency plan and specific legislation. The Trade Weigh Index. 
Remember that, even the solutions that we will analyse hereunder would affect 
to UK as a whole, the main goal that we have to achieve is to look at the solutions from 
the Northern Ireland (and Ireland) point of view and how this proposals would affect the 
Irish border. 
Therefore, the solutions that will be analysed or put on the negotiating table 
once they are resumed, should be aimed, not only to protect what was agreed in the 
Good Friday Agreements / Belfast Agreement, but should also be directed to benefit 
Northern Ireland to a greater extent respectively from the other nations that make up the 
UK, and also to create a certain beneficial situation for the Republic of Ireland and res-
pect their situation in the European Union. 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                              Nº2/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020  
COLECCIÓN DE TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES.  
                                                                                                                                                              34
4.2.1. Joining the EEA (European Economic Area) 
The EEA (European Economic Area), is an Agreement that construct a group 
between the Member States of the European Union and three out of four States of the 
EFTA, except Switzerland. This Agreement entered into force on 1st January 1994 and 
the principal goal that wants to achieve is to create a stringer trade and economic rela-
tion between the States, relating with the 4 liberties from the EU: Free movement of 
goods, services, capital and people.  76
In a paper written by Doherty, McCrudden, Temple Lang, McGowan, Phin-
nemore and Schiek, in April 2017, they did analyse briefly this proposal.  77
Indeed, the main matter we have to take into account is which would be the im-
plications to Northern Ireland to join (with the rest of the UK) the EEA. First of all, one 
of the consequences of joining the EEA would be that Northern Ireland would be outsi-
de the Customs Union and the ECJ would not have any jurisdiction in the territory, so-
mething that we can consider as a great change in the legal framework.  78
The option to enter in the EEA would maintain the status quo, retaining some 
existing arrangements related to the free movement of goods, capital, services and peo-
ple of the EU membership period, and some levels of market integration, but not a com-
plete integration, because Northern Ireland would not be a Member State of the EU.  79
One of the most important items about being an EEA member, regarding Nort-
hern Ireland and the EU benefits is in fact, that Northern Ireland would not be a benefi-
ciary of the CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). The importance of this con-
sequence of withdrawing from the EU lies in the big significance that the Agriculture 
and the Fisheries have in the Northern Irish society. Regarding Brexit, if we have to 
compare which of the 3 territories part of the UK would be the most affected by the 
withdraw, Northern Ireland would be the most affected, without any doubt. 
The European Union, after the signature of the GFA, gave to Northern Ireland a 
vast support in terms of agricultural subsidies. In 2016, Northern Ireland received 
 Glossary: European Economic Area (EEA). Eurostat. Last modification: 3rd February 2020. Brussels. 76
[online][date of access: 27th March 2020] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/
index.php/Glossary:European_Economic_Area_(EEA)
 DOHERTY, B and TEMPLE LANG, J. and MCCRUDDEN, C and MCGOWAN, L and PHINNEMORE, D and 77
SCHIEK, D G., Northern Ireland and ‘Brexit’: The European Economic Area Option (April 4, 2017). U of 
Michigan Law & Econ Research Paper No. 16-038; U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 543; 
Queen's University Belfast Law Research Paper 2018- 01. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2933715
  DOHERTY, B and TEMPLE LANG, J. and MCCRUDDEN, C and MCGOWAN, L and PHINNEMORE, D and 78
SCHIEK, D G, op cit. 77
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350.000 million pounds as part of their CAP amount.  UK is the third country in Eu80 -
rope in agricultural size, after France and Spain, as we can see in the image below. 
 
Source: Atlas de la PAC 
The image show us the percentage of productive agricultural land in the EU in 2013. 
These productive lands are used both for agricultural fields for planting, and for fields 
for feeding cattle, as extensions of land that are used for obtaining wood. And the colour 
of each box gives us the average size of each farm in millions of hectares. It is very in-
teresting to see how the average size of a farmland in the UK exceeds France and Spain, 
the two EU territories with the most productive agricultural land.  81
This obvious fact, joining the amount of money that only Northern Ireland had re-
ceived in the last years, leads to consider that, in terms of agriculture, UK and mostly, 
Northern Ireland, will be the most affected. 
The paper mentioned before gives us two options to make feasible the participation 
of Northern Ireland to the EEA: 
1. The first one, would require the joining of the UK to the EFTA. It could be a 
first move to be an EEA member. But, this EEA membership, would be only for 
Northern Ireland. This limitation of the membership would require an amend-
 CAMPS, CARLOTA. Irlanda del Norte, la más perjudicada por el Brexit.. El Nacional.cat. 16th June 80
2016. London. [online][date of access: 20th March 2020] Available at: https://www.elnacional.cat/es/in-
ternacional/irlanda-norte-brexit-reino-unido-union-europea-referendum_104826_102.html
 View: http://www.porotrapac.org/documentos/atlasdelapac2019_es_web_190408.pdf81
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ment of the EEA Agreement. And such amendment, to succeed, must have the 
approval of all the members of the EU, the EU itself and all the members of 
EFTA that participate of the EEA, so, Switzerland would not be able to decide in 
this matter.  82
2. The second option that would be possible, is the joining of only Northern Ireland 
to the EEA. It would be the first time that a part of a national entity would join 
EEA (Northern Ireland is a country part of the UK). This situation would re-
quire, as the first situation, an amendment of the EEA Agreement, with the ap-
proval of the EU, its member States and all the Member States of the EFTA that 
are Member States of the EEA (again, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland).  83
What we can glimpse in this proposal is clearly not a panacea to the situation on the 
Irish border. While it is true that it would bring some maintenance of the current situa-
tion, it is obvious that certain political and legislative challenges must to be faced for 
Northern Ireland. It is the area that will be most affected by Brexit at the end of the tran-
sition period we were talking about earlier.  
One of the disadvantages that we see here is that, the EEA Agreement does not 
encompass the free movement of agricultural products as part of the free movement of 
goods. Even this material problem, the main goal is, the liberalization of the agricultural 
trade.  84
Also, in the case that Northern Ireland itself would join the EEA, the administra-
tion would have to acquire more legislative competence in the application of sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures in trade, therefore, this increase in legislative powers would 
be detrimental to their possible level of influence in the EU. Remember that some 
members of the EEA are not members of the EU (Norway, Liechtenstein, and Iceland, 
which are part of the EFTA), so they have the right to be consulted only in proposals for 
EU law, but that right only involves consultation, at no time is being able to intervene in 
EU decision-making . 85
In conclusion, the advantages that Northern Ireland could achieve with the ac-
cession to the EEC such as the limitation of the ECJ jurisdiction and the compliance 
with some of the EU legislation are, in our opinion, minimum with the great disadvan-
 DOHERTY, B and TEMPLE LANG, J. and MCCRUDDEN, C and MCGOWAN, L and PHINNEMORE, D and 82
SCHIEK, D G, op cit. 77
 DOHERTY, B and TEMPLE LANG, J. and MCCRUDDEN, C and MCGOWAN, L and PHINNEMORE, D and 83
SCHIEK, D G, op cit. 77, pag. 9-10
 MCMAHON, J, Northern Ireland and Brexit: Avoiding a Hard Border – EEA or a Special Protocol? 84
(December 4, 2017). UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 21/17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3082202
MCMAHON, J, op cit. 8485
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tage of being no more a CAP and CFP beneficiary because, as we said, Northern Ireland 
has an economy based principally in agriculture and fisheries. 
4.2.2. Creation of a Special Protocol on Trade. 
To talk about the possible Protocol in trade for the island of Ireland, we should in-
troduce the example on which that Protocol could be based. In McMahon's work, we are 
told about two different Protocols. The first of all, Protocol 3 to the Treaty of Rome, 
which applied to the then divided Germany, so that it could have a certain internal mar-
ket between the two halves of the country.  The other one, a Protocol applied to thw 86
island of Cyprus, it would not be analysed. 
We are going to analyse the first Protocol. The accession of West Germany to the 
European Communities took place the 1st January 1958. Recall that, at the end of the 
Second World War, Germany was divided in two parts: West Germany, under the Allies 
control (France, UK and USA), and East Germany, under the USSR control. Even 
Berlin itself was splitted in 2 parts (West and East Berlin).  
The post-war situation in the city and in the whole country was devastating. One 
measure that the EEC Member States was to improve the trade between the two parts of 
Germany. This Protocol ceased to be effective when East Germany invoked the Art. 23 
of the Bonn Fundamental Law (West Germany Constitution) to implement the unifica-
tion of Germany in August 1990.  87
The most important assets to take into account from this Protocol are: 
1.  The East Germany products could enter West Germany without any duty re-
garding the Common Custom Tariff or Common Commercial Policy. 
2. The trade arrangements that West Germany and East Germany would achieve, 
would have as a principal goal, not to violate the principles of the Common 
Market, either harm the other EEC Member States economies. 
3. The EEC Member States, with the Regulation 1756/82, would apply common 
custom duties to East German products (but not West Germany) 
4. West Germany had to inform the other Member States about any important trade 
arrangements that would sign with East Germany. 
This Protocol only affected the German internal Market, but, the EEC never consid-
ered East Germany as a Member State .We can assume that this Protocol in West Ger88 -
 MCMAHON, J, op cit. 8486
 DE IRAZAZÁBAL, PABLO J, 1945: El reparto de Alemania y Berlín entre los Aliados.. El Mundo. 05th 87
November 2014. Madrid. [online][date of access: 28th March 2020] Available at: https://www.elmundo.es/
la-aventura-de-la-historia/2014/11/05/5458fbd2268e3e982f8b458c.html 
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many is a good example so that it can be extrapolated to the situation in Northern Ire-
land. We would be talking about a protocol between a Member State (Ireland) and a 
state that is no longer a member (Northern Ireland).  
For Northern Ireland, agricultural trade with Ireland accounts for 82% of its ex-
ports. Neither Scotland nor Wales nor England export as much to Northern Ireland in 
terms of agricultural products as its southern neighbours on the island. We could deduce 
that this solution could maintain to a certain extent the status quo of relations on the is-
land. 
We have already said that the 4 most important assets that we have highlighted 
above would be a good basis for the creation of that Protocol. That instrument should be 
annexed to the Withdrawal Agreement as a fundamental part of Brexit, which it really 
is. We have already pointed out in previous parts of the work the importance of the Irish 
border in this case, the consequences that it could have for both countries and for both 
the European Union (with its Member States) and the UK. 
This Protocol would allow Northern Ireland to remain outside the EU, without 
the need to accept any type of EU legislation, as would happen if it were a member of 
the EEA (the greatest supporter of a total exit from the European Union and a separation 
of all kinds of legislation). It would also allow Northern Ireland to be outside the 
purview of the ECJ. In a Protocol of this kind, we must understand that the more specif-
ic it is, the better and more effective would be. The main objective to be achieved with 
this type of situation is that the instrument used to regulate relations between two enti-
ties offers the greatest possible legal security. 
This Protocol could truly create a legal basis for the actions of the parties invol-
ved, as it would regulate, the legal standards to apply. In the GFA, certain institutions 
were already created in 2 different strands so that they could monitor relations between 
the two parts of the Agreement. These bodies could be, appealing to the principle of 
economy, those in charge of ensuring that said Protocol is strictly complied with. The 
scope of dispute settlement should perhaps follow the same path. That they were the 
same bodies that carry out the monitoring of the Protocol. But we could offer a more 
effective option. That in that Protocol a provision must be included by virtue of which 
the two parties submit their controversies regarding the Protocol to the ECJ, with the 
consent of the two Irish territories. 
Why submit a dispute to a Court that does not have jurisdiction over one of the 
involved parties? We would appeal to the principle of economy. A Protocol based on 
legal points such as those described above in the case of the West Germany Protocol  on 
Trade should have certain provisions that are in accordance with the principles of the 
EU Single Market, as well as the Customs Union. And if we apply to the principle of 
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economy, the jurisdiction of the ECJ, we understand that it is the best solution so that 
they could solve the vicissitudes that could arise between Ireland and Northern Ireland. 
4.2.3. Creation of a “Common No-Custom Area” for Irish-made products.  
We already see the European Commission proposal (Backstop), supported by the 
government of Theresa May, and the political parties’ opinions regarding this backstop, 
but, is there an alternative to this proposal that could be a solution to the border issue? 
Sacerdoti and Moran (2019) had proposed an alternative that could be a solution 
to the Irish border issue.  Their proposal to the backstop, entails the creation of a free 89
circulation area, where the only products that would be able to be admitted in this zone 
would be products originated in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland only, un-
der the dispositions of the art. 24 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT). This article is the one that establishes the Territorial Application, Frontier 
Traffic, Customs Union and Free-trade Areas.  90
This means that the products from the UK that would want to enter the Republic 
of Ireland as final destination through any port or airport from Northern Ireland, would 
have to be subject to regular custom controls. This provision would be also applied to 
all the products that were produced in the EU territory, (we have to understand as EU 
territory, the continental territory of the EU), entering the Republic of Ireland with final 
destination, Northern Ireland.  91
One of the main items of this proposal is to label the domestic products as 
“Irish-made” ones. We should consider that a product that is not labelled as such, could 
not be able to have the same consideration as the products that are labelled as “Irish-
made”.  We can consider this item is important to avoid the eventual abuse of the 92
regime from some UK economic operators that would like to use this special situation 
to avoid pay taxes and put under the Irish authorities all their stuff to be examined in a 
customs control. The authors say also that a good way to ensure this proposal would be 
to maintain the EU SPS Agreements (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreements).  
If this was the offer that the negotiating parts would apply to the Irish border, it 
would be the second time that the EU would accept a special trade regime. The prece-
 SACERDOTI, G AND MORAN, N. An Alternative to the Irish Backstop: An All-Ireland 'Common No-Cus89 -
tom Area' As a Frontier Traffic Area under Art. 24 of Gatt for Products Originating in the Island ('Ire-
land-Made'), Allowing Regulatory Divergence by the UK in Respect of the EU without Necessitating a 
Hard Border in Ireland (September 26, 2019). Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3660166, Sep-
tember 2019. [online][date of access: 13th March 2020] Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3460166  
 SACERDOTI, G AND MORAN, N. op cit. 8990
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dent to this Irish proposal would be the situation between Cyprus and Northern Cyprus. 
We would like to remember that Northern Cyprus is, de facto, non-EU territory. The 
products that are produced in Northern Cyprus are able to pass freely to the other side of 
the border of the island.  93
That proposal would be a good one to apply to the Irish border. The rules of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in this case, the provisions that are part of the GATT, 
could provide better legal certainty to the situation that should replace backstop. Re-
member that the backstop should only be in operation while the negotiating parties did 
not find a better agreement to apply, or while the agreement was being negotiated. 
This suggestion closely resembles the sentence of the Special Protocol on Trade 
described before. But the reality is, that the legal basis of each one is very different. 
While the previous point focused on taking some existing work points in a pre-existing 
Protocol, in this proposal presented to us by Sacerdoti and Moran, the legal basis is, as 
previously stated, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.  
This is an option that could have acceptance among the negotiating parties. It is 
clear that both the EU and the UK are signatory states to the GATT and member states 
of the WTO. Using a common legislative base to find a converging point where the as-
pirations and interests of the parties are largely (or totally) satisfied is a good starting 
point. As specific as the content of a Protocol may be, it is still an instrument that, in 
that case, would only be used by two entities. An international treaty such as the GATT 
generates more legal certainty and trust. 
As the authors say, “this proposal would grant freedom of external trade rela-
tions to the UK and would not entail custom barriers between Northern Ireland and the 
rest of the UK”.  This regime would affect only the Island of Ireland, the customs traf94 -
fic between Northern Ireland and UK, would remain as always. 
4.3. Reunification of Ireland 
The reunification of Ireland has been on the table for a while now. And even 
more so with the victory of Sinn Fein in the Irish elections in early February. But it is 
evident that it is an option that perhaps has in the situation that we are, little journey.  95
The basis of this statement lies in the Irish / North-Irish political spectrum that conti-
nues to demand the unification of the island, or that, at least, has it on its list of political 
objectives to achieve. 
 SACERDOTI, G AND MORAN, N. op cit. 8993
 SACERDOTI, G AND MORAN, N. op cit. 8994
 Irish unification is becoming likelier. The Economist. February 2020. London. [online] [date of access: 95
17th February 2020] Available at:https://www.economist.com/leaders/2020/02/13/irish-unification-is-be-
coming-likelier
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We speak again, of political party Sinn Fein. In its early days, it advocated the 
independence of Ireland from the UK, and now its main political goal in capital letters 
is unification with Northern Ireland. We could try to find out what would be the essen-
tial requirement for this to take place among the North-Irish population. Let us remem-
ber that this conflict between north and south resides solely and exclusively in religion. 
Catholics against Anglican Protestants and vice versa. 
An article from The Economist from the beginning of this year 2020, gave us a 
very interesting fact. For the first time in history, the North Irish population that de-
clares itself Catholic outnumbers the Anglican Protestant.  96
 
Source: The Economist  97
Another fact that could give us a boost in this theory of an Irish reunification, 
happens through the vote of the Brexit referendum. In Northern Ireland, the option to 
remain members of the European Union won. We have already seen in other sections 
that Northern Ireland is a recipient of subsidies from the European Union as part of the 
CAP. It was in their interest to stay in the Union. Very few people in the Belfast Gov-
ernment believed the Downing Street Government when they were told that the losses 
of the CAP would be compensated by a UK-owned land policy. It may be possible, but 
in the very long term. 
The idea of the reunification lies nowadays is the GFA. If the Republic of Ire-
land wants to be unified with Northern Ireland, the north part of the island should cele-
  Brexit and Sinn Fein’s success boost talk of Irish unification. The Economist. February 2020 London. 96
[online] [date of access: 17th February 2020] Available at:: https://www.economist.com/briefing/
2020/02/13/brexit-and-sinn-feins-success-boost-talk-of-irish-unification
 See Footnote number 95.97
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brate a referendum and decide if they want to be fully Irish or maintain the current state 
they have now. 
4.4. The inverse contingency plan and specific legislation. The Trade Weight Index. 
In this section, we will try to create our own solution to this issue. First of all, 
we have to establish a basis where this proposal lies. This proposal only addresses the 
problem at a trade sphere. We consider that, in a people’s movement between territories 
field, the CTA creates a good legal basis for the free movement of people. This 
arrangement was initiated by both countries in 1922 and by the moment, this arrange-
ment works effectively. In terms of trade, between the EU and the UK, one of the most 
important sectors, is the agri-food one. As we saw before, UK is the third country in Eu-
rope with more millions of hectares of land in terms of agriculture, and the first one to 
have to largest average size of land (more than 75 hectares per piece of land). 
The European Union and the UK have a beneficial agri-food relation.  
 
Source: European Commission 
This are the most exported products from the EU (as a whole) to the UK. But we 
have to see, within the EU, which Member States are the ones that export the most to 
the UK. 
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Source: European Commission 
In this graphic, we see that Ireland is the third exporter from the EU to the UK. 
Now, we are going to explain an imaginative proposal with an example created 
for this paper. The data that we used as a base for make our experiment, came from 
OEC website of the year 2017 . The main goal of this experiment is to establish a “so98 -
lution” based in a modification of the principle of freedom of movement of goods. 
 We can describe this initiative, as a peculiar application of an imports and ex-
ports quota system. The main idea of this suggestion would be to favour commercial 
exchanges that were truly important for operators on both sides of the Irish border, pe-
nalizing punctual and merely speculative trade and the creation of a specific legislation 
regarding traceability of the products (a hybrid proposal with Sacerdoti and Moran’s 
one and the creation of the Special Protocol on Trade).  
Normally, a quota system works as follows. If Operator A wants to export Oper-
ator B a certain product, B's import quota system will impose a quantitative ceiling on 
exports of that product that can pass freely through the border (in case there is some 
freedom of movement of goods). From this limit, operator A will have to pay certain 
charges (proportional to the amount of more he wants to export) to be able to export his 
products. Our proposal would have the same structure, but its application would be just 
the opposite. 
The basis of our trade proposal lies in what we could classify or determine as the 
trade weight index. What this concept would help us establish is, for economic opera-
tors (in this case Ireland and Northern Ireland), which are the most important and bene-
ficial trade exchanges for them. The more important and beneficial to both is the prod-
 See: https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/import/gbr/irl/show/2017/ and https://oec.world/en/98
visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/gbr/irl/show/2017/
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uct imported / exported, the less pecuniary burden must be paid by economic operators, 
up to the point of having no pecuniary burdens to pay. The main goal of this proposal 
would be to create an intra-Irish market that would have several levels of importance, 
and create incentives to exchange those products that are truly important for the internal 
market of the island. To determine this trade weight, we should base the concept on the 
corresponding money amount of each product in the trade "basket" of imports and ex-
ports. We must keep in mind that determining a percentage as the inflection point to un-
derstand that a product is important in this "basket", is not easy.  
In terms of the specific regulation, the idea of Sacedorti and Moran is to main-
tain the EU legislation, the labelling of the products and make the article 24 of the 
GATT the legal basis of the proposal. Our idea is to create a specific legal framework 
for the traceability and safety of the foodstuffs only for the Irish territory, taking into 
account the GATT and the EU legislation but not making them our legal basis. With this 
we can understand that the proposal of Sacerdoti and Moran, previously analysed, could 
lead to certain abuses by operators, both in the Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ire-
land, even from the island of Great Britain, if we apply this literally. 
Recall that the authors' proposal was to subject an open border between the two 
Irish to the rules of Article 24 of the GATT and that products that freely pass through 
the border should bear an "Irish-made" label, maintaining the EU legislation in terms of 
sanitary and phytosanitary procedures. How can you reliably determine that a product is 
Irish-made? If we talk about butter, should we go see the cow that produces the milk, 
and be present throughout all the steps that we must do to produce butter? Where is the 
cow? Is conditio sine qua non that the cow must be in the island of Ireland before the 
manufacturing of the product?  
We are not saying that the proposal would not comply with the WTO regulations 
in terms of trade. Is obvious that all the legislation that is not EU made, must comply 
with the WTO legal framework. What we are saying is that, the idea of subordinate the 
proposal in only one article of the GATT (in this case, article 24, which establish the 
Common Custom Areas), would have a little modification with the creation of the new 
regulation. This regulation would have a single objective taking into account the “Irish-
made” label of Sacerdoti and Moran’s proposal; and that would be the creation of a new 
product traceability regulation, applicable to the Irish Island territory. The fact that 
Northern Ireland is not an EU member state (and in this proposal we assume that it 
would not be part of EEA or EFTA), make us to consider that the EEA and EFTA mem-
bers would fell displeased by the fact that a non-EU member is beneficiary of a EU leg-
islation without being either an EU member, or a EEA or EFTA member. 
The fact that this project is based solely on Article 24 of the GATT and an even-
tual maintenance of the EU legislation, we understand that it would not be sufficient and 
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effective, since we have to point that the traceability rules from the European Union, 
would not be in force in the Northern Irish territory, since that country is no more an EU 
Member State and, we can consider not very effective to create an Optim-in/Optim-out 
system for the Northern Ireland territory.  What is proposed in this section is different 99
from that of Sacerdoti and Moran. As we have pointed out before, the structure of this 
proposal is based on its own application of an import and export quota system, and the 
creation of a specific legal framework in terms of traceability. 
And another asset that we have to take into account would the form of the in-
strument that could include all this matters. Here the Special Protocol on Trade takes 
place again. As we saw before, this special Protocol would create the relation basis be-
tween Northern Ireland, Ireland and the EU as the one applied to West and East Ger-
many during the Cold War. In this case, our Special Protocol on Trade for the island of 
Ireland would include: 
1. The relation basis between Ireland and Northern Ireland, and the relations of 
both countries with the unions in which they participate (Ireland-EU and 
Northern Ireland-UK) in the same way as we saw in the Special Protocol on 
Trade in Germany. 
2. The contingency plan that we are going to explain hereunder. 
3. The new legislation regarding products traceability between the two Ire-
lands, to create a stable basis for the application of the “Irish-made label” of 
Sacerdoti and Moran. 
4. A control system composed by the institutions created in virtue of the signa-
ture of the GFA in 1998. 
Determined the principal aim and the legal sphere of our experiment, we will 
begin the explanation of the trade matter. For this we will use tables and graphics, so it 
would be a more visual context and be more understandable to the reader. First, make a 
note. The data used was originally for the UK as a whole. We have made the necessary 
calculations to use, in the example, data that we extrapolate to the territory of Northern 
Ireland (the percentages). The data that we have used to make the calculations has been 
the percentage of population that Northern Ireland constitutes in the UK in total. 
Secondly, we have to point that all the data relating to the limits and the TWI 
point of importance, is completely randomly established, and obviously could be an-
 Regulation (EC) Nº 853/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 29 April 2004, laying 99
down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin. (OJ L 139, 30.4.2004, p.55) [online][date of access: 
1st April 2020] Available at: https:/ /eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?
uri=CELEX:02004R0853-20190726&from=EN
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alysed and modified by economists skilled in the subject. If we have used these data it is 
to be able to establish a basic model of this experiment. UK has a total population of 
66.400.000 people . Northern Ireland has 1.882.000 people . It represents the 2.83% 100 101
of the total population of the UK. 
We are going to work with 3 type of products: Animal products, vegetable prod-
ucts and foodstuffs, and our currency will be EUROS (€). We have to point this now 
because, the model that we are going to create it will be based in the principle of econ-
omy. The most simple and easy we make the model, the most understandable would it 
be for the readers. 
WHAT IMPORTS NORTHERN IRELAND FROM IRELAND? /WHAT EX-
PORTS IRELAND TO NORTHERN IRELAND? 
Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website. 
WHAT EXPORTS NORTHERN IRELAND TO IRELAND? / WHAT IM-
PORTS IRELAND FROM NORTHERN IRELAND? 
Type of products Total money (NI) Percentage (NI)
Animal Products 72.789.128’65€ 15%
Vegetable Products 8.750.182’50€ 2.2%
Foodstuffs 68.659.244’90€ 14%
Type of products Total money (NI) Percentage (NI)
Animal Products 30.687.991’13€ 5.7%
 S e e : h t t p s : / / w w w . g o o g l e . c o m / s e a r c h ?100
q=reino+unido+poblaci%C3%B3n&oq=reino&aqs=chrome.0.69i59j69i57j46j0j46j69i61j69i60l2.1646j
0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8
 S e e : h t t p s : / / w w w . g o o g l e . c o m / s e a r c h ?101
sxsrf=ALeKk00NZ_1_DKTywRf8oTBNi7ZPJJPFeA%3A1585748085114&ei=dZiEXsu_BsmFjLsPke-
K4kA4&q=irlanda+del+norte+poblaci%C3%B3n&oq=ir&gs_lcp=CgZwc3ktYWIQAxgCMgQIIxAn-
MgQIIxAnMgQIIxAnMgQIABBDMgQIABBDMgQIABBDMgQIABBDMgQIABBDMgIIADIECAAQQzo-
ECAAQR1CcgQRY2IkEYKWdBGgBcAF4AIABZYgBrAKSAQMxLjKYAQCgAQGqAQdnd3Mtd2l6&sclien
t=psy-ab
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Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
These are our products. We chose this 3, considering that are the most important 
and more common in intra-Ireland trade.   102
Now, we are going to make a breakdown of every group of products, in the same 
order than the tables. First, we are going to talk about the importations of Northern Ire-
land from Ireland in animal and agricultural products, as well as foodstuffs. One of the 
points that is good to make is that, in the graphics that we are going to use, there are 
only 4 products. We are going to use only the 4 most imported and exported products in 
the intra-island trade. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
As we can see in this graphic, the most imported product inside the animal 
products’ group is Bovine meat. In the grey group, aside from horses, other living ani-
mals that are imported are, for example, donkeys and mules. 
Vegetable products 12.664.030’84€ 2.5%
Foodstuffs 65.502.098’71€ 12%
 In this case, the percentages we have used in each table are the data we have extrapolated from the 102
UK data as a whole in each of the product groups. We understand that we should create this fiction, since 
if we did not create it, the calculations and setting the ceiling for our plan would not be effective
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Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
In this graphic is so clear that the agriculture is very important for the intra-Ire-
land trade. The fact that vegetables are the 72% of the imports of Northern Ireland gives 
us some sort of clue of what would be the trade weigh index for this products. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
In this image we can see the 4 most imported foodstuffs products in Northern Ireland. 
But, what is a foodstuff product? We can describe them as all merchandise that requires 
a previous period of handling before consumption. These products are not raw materi-
als. These are always elaborated. 
Now, is the exportations from Northern Ireland to Republic of Ireland turn. 
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Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
In this case, we see that, comparing of the animal products imported from Ire-
land, Northern Ireland exports a 29% less in bovine meat than the imports. It can be 
useful when we will have to put the limit in our trade weigh index. 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
In this graphic, we see, comparing to the imports one, that Northern Ireland ex-
ports so different agricultural products that they import to Republic of Ireland. We see 
here that the exports of Northern Ireland are base in cereals, mostly in wheat in two 
forms: in form of flour and in form of grains. 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                              Nº2/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020  
COLECCIÓN DE TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES.  
                                                                                                                                                              50
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
In this graphic happens a similar situation as the previous one. In this case, the 
only two products that are repeating here are the pastry and bakery products and the an-
imal food. But in any time we can see here any sign of animal products that are been 
elaborated or handled into a certain extent to be consumed.  
Now what we must do is establish the point from which it can be understood 
that a product, according to the trade weight index, can freely pass through the Irish 
border without the need to pay any tax. That is what we will call the TWI point of im-
portance. Probably, this is the most difficult step in our experiment. What we consider 
important in terms of trade? The concept of importance in this area is closely linked to 
our trade weight index. Everything that we consider important we must understand that 
it has a higher trade weight index than other products that are imported or exported (is 
something that is imported in vast quantity by the operators). We must also understand 
what is important as what in the country's commercial system constitutes the core of its 
exports and imports. 
 In this case, our core is constituted by the products analysed before: Animal 
products, Agricultural products and Foodstuffs.  The criteria that we will use to establish 
the importance inside the trade weigh index is the monetary one. Another question that 
we should address is, if we have to establish the same point of importance for Northern 
Ireland than for Ireland. The answer would be no. Why? Because is the paradigm of in-
equality (to treat two different situations the same way). We just cannot treat Republic 
Ireland and Northern Ireland as equals, because the situation in an economic spectrum is 
not the same. We consider proper to benefit the two Irelands but, always, defending 
their interests.  
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 Now we are going to describe the situation for the importations of Northern Ire-
land from Republic of Ireland. 
S103
ource: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
In this picture, we can see that the TWI point of importance is established in 
9.000.000 €. 4 out of 7 categories analysed in the graphic would have been benefitted of 
the exemption. The other categories, if they could increase their amount of money in the 
“basket” of importations, they would have to pay less taxes. 
 As we said before, we are not going to establish the same TWI point of impor-
tance for Ireland, since the economy of the southern zone of the island is not in the 
same level as the Northern part, and even the data are not similar. 
 104
 The colour duality does not mean that the blue part will continue to pay taxes. We used two colours to 103
make more visible the TWI point of importance. As the money amount in the “basket” exceeds the TWI, 
all the category will be tax exempt.
 See footnote 100.104
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Source: Own elaboration based on the data extracted from OEC website 
 In this second graphic, the category of Cereals is composed by Barley, Wheat 
grains and Wheat flour. In this case, we can see that the TWI point of importance is es-
tablished at 3 million euros. As was said before, the situation in an economic spectrum 
of both countries is not similar, even politically are not similar. In this graphic we can 
see that, 6 out of 7 categories are benefitted with the exemption of paying taxes, since 
are surpassing the TWI point of importance. However, categories as milk or cereals, are 
surpassing the limit with a tiny amount of money. 
 Now, we are going to develop a little more the idea that, the more money you 
spend exporting and importing products, the less taxes you would pay. As we saw pre-
viously, Northern Ireland and Ireland had a different TWI point of importance. Certain-
ly, the difference would be applying to the taxes rates that would have to pay the eco-
nomic operators, and this rates would be different to the products, too. As a basic exam-
ple, not using the data previously exposed, if operator A wants to import Bovine Meat 
from operator B, the tax rates imposed to the quantity of meat (in money) imported 
would vary.  
 For instance, operator A wants to import 100.000€ in bovine meat from operator 
B. The tax rate would be of the 35% of the amount. If operator A raises the amount of 
money to 250.000€, the tax rate would be of the 20%. In the case that this import 
amount would be increased to 500.000€, the tax rate would be of the 10%; and when the 
amount of money of the importation of bovine meat would exceed the TWI point of im-
portance, the tax rate would be 0, and the meat would be able to arrive to operator A. 
 What we want to achieve with this proposal would be, as we mentioned before 
at the beginning of the section, to improve the essential trade between the operators (Ire-
land and Northern Ireland). Everything that we can consider essential in trade regarding 
this experiment, in a “negative” way of presentation, is everything that could cause a 
harmful effect in the trade basket of the operator (and in the consumers’) with their ab-
sence. The “essential” products, as we said before, can change as the economy and the 
consumer and operator’s necessities, therefore, is something illogical to create a nu-
merus clausus list of products. 
In conclusion, our proposal lies in three pillars: the first one is our inverse con-
tingency plan. The second one is the creation of the new traceability regulation for the 
Island of Ireland, making sure that, all the products can be traceable and can wear the 
“Irish-made” label that Sacerdoti and Moran propose in their paper. And the last one, 
would be the establishment of the relation basis between Northern Ireland and the Eu-
ropean Union via a Protocol. The main aim of this proposal would be, in terms of trade, 
avoiding the hard border between the two Irelands regarding all the products that are 
essential in the “basket” of importations, favouring this kind of trade. The essentialness 
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of the products would be changing with the market necessities. The point that we are 
separating the products that are not important from the ones that can be categorised as 
important, lies in the fact that create a free trade area, without taking into account the 
economic sphere of the operators (one of the operators would be inside the European 
Union, but not the other one) could lead to some abuses from some economic operators. 
Obviously, the political situation in the island would be affected of this proposal, but, as 
the UK must defend their interest regarding trade in Northern Ireland, the European 
Union must also defend their Member States, in this case, the Republic of Ireland. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 The GFA is, without a doubt, the pillar of the Irish border negotiations in Brex-
it’s framework. From the beginning of Brexit, the Agreement played a very relevant role 
at the negotiating table on the border and both the European and British teams knew that 
without the protection of this Agreement, there was a chance that Brexit would material-
ize without any agreement. 
This document is the end of a bloody 30-year confrontation on the Northern Ire-
land territory, and its protection is key for relations between the EU and the UK to go 
down a path of cordiality and friendship. Furthermore, the influence of the EU with the 
PEACE program gives more importance to the protection and role of the Good Friday 
Agreement in these negotiations, so this programme, although the UK is no more a EU 
member and this mechanism was created by the EU institutions in 1995, would be nec-
essary to continue with this project, due to the moderate success that it has in the territo-
ry. 
 We know that the GFA is the fundamental pillar of the negotiations but, although 
this Agreement was signed during the UK’s membership in the EEC/EU, we can verify 
our thesis (The Brexit can break the entente cordiale established in 1998 with the Good 
Friday Agreement). The Brexit (a hard one) is capable to break the situation established 
in 1998 with the signature of the Agreement. The GFA created an "Aristotelian virtue" 
between the two Irelands, and with the influence of the PEACE programme from the 
EU, created in 1995, although there still are some situations of confrontation in the 
northern Irish territory.  
 The possibility of the Brexit became hard, even in the end of the Implementation 
period, is a fear that the population of the border between Northern Ireland and the Re-
public of Ireland have. The absence of any kind of agreement between the parts could 
lead to reopen old wounds that, 22 years after the end of the armed conflict, are still 
healing in the both Irish societies. The solution that the negotiations teams have to 
reach, must find another middle way that can effectively fit in all sense with the GFA. 
FIRST: Answering the first question we ask in the introduction of this paper 
(what would be, in the framework of Brexit (in the territory of the island of Ireland), the 
solution so that the establishment of a hard border between the two Irelands can be ef-
fectively avoided?), our conclusion lies in the fact that the best solution is the one that 
defends both Irelands interests, but also the interests of the EU and the UK. As we said 
before, and it is been confirmed during the paper, this is not an easy solving problem. In 
this matter, we are not only talking about trade, since the problem transcends to a more 
social and political sphere. As stated before, the interests of the two Ireland should be 
the main objectives in the negotiations, but it is evident that, being these two territories, 
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members of two different unions (EU and UK), there is a risk that the interests of the 
unions prevail over those of the affected territories.  
Each one of the proposed solutions, including the reunification of the island, are 
proposals that have their advantages and disadvantages. Nonetheless, our plan we con-
sider is the best option, as it includes the three best “solutions” analysed. The creation of 
a Protocol with the structure that we have described at the beginning of the previous 
section creates, in our opinion, a good legal basis to establish good relations between 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, avoiding a hard border in terms of trade and defending the 
interests from both sides in the negotiation. As we also said at the beginning of the pre-
vious section, this solution is exclusively based on trade, since we believed that the per-
spective of freedom of movement of people was well established with the CTA. We un-
derstand that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages in many aspects, although 
Northern Ireland's failure to participate in the CAP and CFP is a major disadvantage. 
A Protocol between an EU Member State and a non-member State, such as the 
situation presented to us, which includes the basic regime of relations between them, the 
established contingency plan, the new product traceability regulation and a control sys-
tem operated by the institutions created from the GFA, we understand that it creates the 
most perfect situation to avoid establishing a hard border between the Republic of Ire-
land and Northern Ireland. 
The other reason why we understand that this is the best option, lies in the fact that 
if the control of the correct application and non-violation of the Protocol resides in the 
institutions created from the GFA, we are protecting the agreement, and consequently, 
we are maintaining relations between the participants at the point where it were estab-
lished in 1998. 
SECOND: In the framework of the relations and accession of Ireland and the UK 
to the EEC, we can conclude that, although relations during the first years of accession 
were tense due to the armed conflict in Northern Ireland, the accession of Both coun-
tries to the EEC in 1973 were not only an advantage in the commercial and economic 
spheres for both the new States and those already within the EEC, but also meant a 
gradual improvement in relations between the two countries. Recall that the GFA was 
signed during the membership of both countries in the EEC, so it is evident that rela-
tions underwent an improvement within the Community, and later the EU.  
Therefore, we can conclude that being a member of the EEC/EU at the same time, 
was a benefit to improve the cold and tense relations between both countries. It must 
also be said that, although the effective aid of the Community came a little later than it 
would have been ideal (in 1995), the PEACE program has been important to the process 
of reconciliation between societies, and if we emphasize that this has reached a fourth 
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phase, we can understand that it has had sufficient success so that both Northern Ireland 
and the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the EU have continued to implement, not only 
financial aid to the border area between the two Irelands, but also social reconciliation 
and education programs for young people and families who have been at odds for 
decades. 
The fact that it was the Irish and BriLsh Governments themselves that took the first step to 
start the peace process to a conflict that in 30 years took the lives of 3500 people, is indicaLve 
that membership in the Community was a point of inflecLon in the management of relaLons 
between the two countries and in the will to establish a peace that was urgently needed. 
THIRD: The importance of the Irish border in the context of Brexit is fundamen-
tal. Part of the good relations between the EU and the UK go through the establishment 
or not of a hard border in the island territory. 
From the first moment in which the referendum on the permanence or not of the 
UK in the EU was put on the table, part of the eyes focused on the neighbour island. It 
is true that with the GFA an entente was established that kept the conflict away, but as 
we have already established before, Brexit itself has jeopardized that entente and even, 
if at the end of the transition period there is no agreement, the GFA could be in danger. 
There is no room for false steps or legal loopholes as to how the border between the two 
Irelands should be established, in the event that one has to be finally established. Peace 
in Ireland was achieved thanks to the understanding between the Irish and British gov-
ernments and the financial, social and institutional support of the EU. 
It has already been proven that the conflict in the border territory goes beyond the 
commercial or political sphere. It is a religiously based social conflict that has been in-
stalled in the Northern Ireland area for many years and it is evident that the establish-
ment of a hard border between the two Ireland can trigger a violation of the GFA by 
those who do not want to be separated from the republican area of the island, where 
friends or family are found. 
Therefore, we understand that the solution that must be established, once again, is 
to avoid at all costs the totally hard border, always, defending the interests of Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland and the Unions which each one belongs to. 
FOURTH: Brexit has been, without a doubt, the most controversial situation of 
the last decades in the territory of the EU. For the first time in history, a Member State 
of the Union decided to abandon the project started in 1952 with the ECSC and in 1957 
with EEC. Although it is true that the UK was the most Eurosceptic country of the 
group of Member States of the EU nothing foreshadowed that said Euro-scepticism 
would end up winning the battle. 
CEI, Centro Adscrito a la Universitat de Barcelona                                              Nº2/2020, 2 DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2020  
COLECCIÓN DE TRABAJOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN DEL M.U. EN DIPLOMACIA Y ORGANIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES.  
                                                                                                                                                              57
If Brexit has become effective, we must conclude that it was, first, because at no 
time was it calculated that the LEAVE side would win the referendum held on July 23, 
2016. It is true that the holding of that referendum depended on the victory of the Con-
servative party in 2015, and in fact, Cameron was enslaved by his words when he saw 
himself the winner with an absolute majority of those elections in the UK. But the mis-
take that many made was not giving enough credit to those in favour of withdrawing 
from the Union.  
We can conclude, then, that Brexit has been a set of catastrophic misfortunes (for 
the UK itself and for the EU) within a country that, even with the Optim-out system es-
tablished for them, being outside the monetary Union, not being part of the Schengen 
area and creating From the British check in 1984, the misinterpretations of Eurosceptic 
parties (UKIP above all) made the withdrawal from the EU a fact. 
Let us emphasize the fact that the basis of the Brexit campaign, or most of it, was 
based on the slogan "Take back control", referring to border and immigration control. 
As previously stated, and is evident from the work, the UK, like Ireland, was never part 
of the Schengen Agreements, so even being part of the EU, border control was always 
in hands of the British authorities. 
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